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I. IMPORTANCE OF INDIRECT TAXES FOR EUROPE
Matters of taxation seem to be an important issue with respect to
any state. The right to tax and the question of who determines the
right to tax have always been at the center of the political debate.
For example, in England the Crown and Parliament have struggled
over the control of taxes' and in the U.S. it took much debate and
a constitutional amendment 2 to enable the federation to levy
meaningful taxes.
1. See 0. HoOD PHILLIPS, THE PRINCIPLES OF ENGLISH LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 256-
259 (London 1939); E.C.S. Wade, G. Godfrey Philips, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 36-38 (7th ed.
1965) (citing Bates' Case, 2 St. Tr. 371, K. L. 48 (1606); The King v. Hampden, 3 St.Tr. 825,
K.& L. 50 (1637).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; see Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 568 (1880), Pollock
v. Farmers Loan Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895), Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107




Similar controversies and developments are taking place in the
Member States of the European Community.3 The Treaty of
Rome4 (the "Treaty") devotes a whole subchapter to the problems
of taxation.5 However, the subchapter does not permit the EC to
levy taxes.' The rules are designed to avoid distortion of competi-
tion caused by the tax rules of the Member States. It was clear
from the beginning that a harmonization, especially of indirect
taxes, was necessary because of the trade and competition distor-
tions created by the existing differences between the Member
States. Such distortion was incompatible with the basic principles
and major goals of the Common Market.
7
The European Economic Community (EEC) enacted several
directives' to harmonize indirect taxes, especially the Value Added
Tax (VAT). The implementation of these measures led to a series
of questions which concern fundamental constitutional principles
of community law. The notion of supremacy of EEC law, the im-
mediate applicability of both "primary" and "secondary" EEC
law,9 including Directives, and related questions gave rise to a se-
ries of disputes which began in the early 1960's1o and are still on-
going.1" At the same time, VAT-related cases raised issues concern-
ing the power and competence of the European Court of Justice.
1 2
The intense discussion and great attention devoted to all these
3. For a very detailed discussion of the recent political and technical arguments by
Member States and the academic world with respect to the harmonization of the rules on
taxation, see F~d6ration Internationale pour le droit europ~en, 14e Congr~s, Madrid, Vol. II,
L'harmonisation fiscale: le D~fi de 1993, Madrid, 1990 [hereinafter FIDE 1990] (in particu-
lar, the general report of Chairman Prout, p. 283).
4. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY]; see also
T.M.C. ASSER INSTITUUT, GUIDE TO EEC LEGISLATION, Suppl. 1987.
5. EEC TREATY, Art. 95.
6. EC resources are levied on the basis of a decision pursuant to EEC TREATY, Art. 201.
7. Id. at Arts. 2-3.
8. See, K.R. SIMMONDS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, Vol. B., 10-228
(1974).
9. Primary EEC Law is the law of the Treaties themselves, secondary legislation com-
prises all the enactments created by the community institutions themselves, based on the
Treaties.
10. See, e.g., Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse administratie der belast-
ingen, 1962 E.C.R. 1; Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593.
11. See Case 148/78, Ministero Publico v. Ratti, 1979 E.C.R. 1629; Case 8/81, Becker v.
Finanzamt M~nster Innenstadt, 1982 E.C.R 53 (decision of the court at 70 record 17, 74
record 41).
12. A decision of the German Bundesfinanzhof (BFH) is a good example, see Rijkele
Betten and Servaas Van Thiel, Direct Effect of Sixth VAT Directive Denied, 26 European
Taxation 22 (1986); The Bundesverfassungsgericht has explicitly overruled this decision
(Judgement of Oct. 22,1986, 73 BVerfGE 339, 366) See 25 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 201 (1988).
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issues reflects the fact that the fiscal borders were a major' s obsta-
cle to the creation of the internal market. For many Member
States indirect taxes were a major source of revenue. Any Euro-
pean Community (EC) interference with those taxes was, there-
fore, a substantial limitation on their sovereignty. On the other
hand, up to 1.4% (originally 1.0%) of the taxable basis of the VAT
is part of the "own resources" which finances the EC.14 Therefore,
the EC had a vital budgetary interest in the matter as well.
The following analysis of the development of harmonization of
indirect taxes in the EC will include six steps. First, the general
powers and the legislative history of the EC with respect to indi-
rect taxes will be considered. In a second part, the pre-1993 VAT
system will be described, and the incompatibility of that system
with the notion of an internal market will be analyzed. The third
part will describe how the intended definitive and the adopted
transitional VAT system will deal with these issues as of January
1, 1993 and discuss proposals (including the original proposals of
the Commission)" in this respect. Then, in a fourth part, problems
and proposals with respect to the harmonization of excise duties
will be discussed. The adopted new rules will be discussed in a
fifth part. The sixth part contains the final evaluation and puts the
total package on indirect taxes into perspective with respect to the
developments relating to the establishment of the internal market
as a whole.
13. A decision of the German Bundesfinanzhof is a good example, see Judgement of
25.4.1985, 26 [1986] European Taxation 22. The Bundesverfassungsgericht has explicitly
overruled this decision (Judgement of 22.10.1986, 73 BV34fGE 339 (366 et seq.) See 25
[1988] CMLRev 201.
14. 1985 O.J. (L 128) 15, art. 3(2) (council decision 85/257/EEC, EURATOM, on the
Communities' system of own resources May 7, 1985); 1970 O.J. (L 94) 19 (the own resources
were originally introduced by council decision 70/243/ECSC/EEC/EURATOM on the Com-
munities' own resources).
15. Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Council, COM(85)310 final; Completion of the Internal Market: approximation of indi-
rect tax rates and harmonization of indirect tax structures, COM(87)320 final; Proposal for
a Council directive supplementing the common system of VAT and amending Directive 77/
388/EEC: Approximation of VAT rates, COM (87)321 final; The introduction of a VAT
clearing mechanism for intra-community sales, COM(87)323 final; Proposal for a Council




II. LEGAL BASIS AND POLITICAL IMPORTANCE
1. The Goals of the Common Market
The EEC is not an omnipotent state, but a supranational or-
ganization, whose powers are limited.16 The Treaty must authorize
the exercise of lawmaking powers. According to Art. 2, the main
goal of the Treaty is the creation of the common market. This
common market should have all the characteristics of a national
market.1 7 The activities which in the eyes of the drafters of the
Treaty would lead to the establishment of such a market are
spelled out in Art. 3 of the Treaty:
'For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Com-
munity shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in accor-
dance with the timetable set out therein
a) the elimination, as between Member States, of customs du-
ties and of quantitative restrictions on the import and export of
goods, and of all other measures having equivalent effect;
f) the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the
Common Market is not distorted;
h) the approximation of the laws of Member States to the ex-
tent required for the proper functioning of the Common Market;
2. Taxation-related Problems for the Creation of an Internal
Market
The necessity for the EC to act is a result of the possible effect
that taxation - particularly indirect taxation - has on the creation
of the internal market. The goal is to create conditions which will
allow the movement of goods, persons, and capital as if there were
no boundaries among the Member States. The first main step to-
wards the creation of such conditions was the creation of the cus-
toms union."8 Among the Member States no duties, tariffs or quan-
titative restrictions are to be applied. However, the Member States
remained free in principle to regulate taxation. Therefore, border
controls did not disappear. At all times since the creation of the
EC, the Member States have used the old borders for the purpose
16. Gert Nicolaysen, Principe de Competence d'Attribution, Europaisches Geimein-
schaftsrecht 43 (Stuttgart 1979); Beutler, Bieber, Pipkorn, Streil, Europaisch Gemeinschaft-
Rechtsordnung und Politik 75 (Baden-Baden 3rd.ed. 1987).
17. See, EEC TREATY, Art. 8(a).
18. Id., at Arts. 3, 9, 12.
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of tax clearance and tax adjustments.'9
Originally, the Member States used a variety of turnover and.
excise taxes." In most cases these were only applicable to national
consumption. In case of export, any tax levied would be reim-
bursed. At the same time a wide variety of turnover tax systems
were used. All were based on the idea that only national consump-
tion would be burdened. Many of the systems operated on the ba-
sis of a cascade-type turnover tax.21 Any particular transaction
would be burdened with a specific tax rate. On the next production
stage, the price would already include some tax. But again, the tax
would be levied on the product without discount, yet the particular
tax burden of a product would be compensated upon export. Simi-
lar rules applied to excise duties, but the duties would not become
due if the goods were exported or until the goods were removed
from bond.
The tax compensation systems created a certain dilemma. On
the one hand, they were necessary to avoid distortion of competi-
tion. The tax burden a particular product would carry depended,
to a great extent, on the tax structure of the particular Member
State. It also depended on the structure of the company, since
highly vertically integrated corporations created less taxable com-
mercial turnover than several independent companies operating
one after the other.2 2 In order to limit the impact of the tax differ-
ential, it was considered better to allow each country to reimburse
the product-related (indirect) taxes upon export and to permit the
country of importation to levy the same indirect tax upon import
at rates similar to the burden sustained by a national product of
the same kind.
On the other hand, the inherent danger of the tax compensa-
tion is that export subsidies are hidden or that tax compensation
upon imports turns out to be a hidden import duty or import re-
striction. The difficult problems of establishing the exact tax bur-
den of a particular product, which had on previous production
stages been subject to the cascade-type turnover tax, made just
19. The borders are also used for immigration and health control (phytosanitary
checks).
20. See S. Van Thiel, Harmonization of Turnover Taxes in the European Communi-
ties: Towards the Internal Market without frontiers, 28 EUROPEAN TAXATION 77 (1988)
(Footnote 4).
21. France had already introduced a certain kind of VAT, which was, however, different




compensation even more difficult.
These difficulties are reflected in Articles 95 - 99 of the Treaty.
Article 95 prohibits levying taxes on products originating in other
EEC Member States which are higher than the taxes on compara-
ble domestic products and taxes designed to protect competing do-
mestic production.2" Articles 96 and 98 prohibit the refund of do-
mestic direct taxes and of indirect taxes insofar as the refund is
greater than the actual tax burden for a particular product. Special
consideration was given to the formerly existing cascade turnover
tax systems. Since it is difficult to determine which tax burden is
placed on any particular product, Member States were permitted
by virtue of Article 97 to refund cascade turnover taxes on the ba-
sis of the burden of average products.
This system assured a certain tax neutrality. Yet, the neutral-
ity was achieved at the expense of using border adjustments.
Therefore, the borders were a necessary element of the system and
could not disappear. It was understood that further steps would be
necessary to create a system which would be more adequate with
respect to the general goal of creating a common market (now
more commonly referred to as "internal market"). Such a new sys-
tem would have to be based on a harmonization of the Member
States' substantive tax laws.
Article 99, in its original version, permitted the Commission to
"consider how the legislation of the various Member States con-
cerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect
taxation, including countervailing measures applicable to trade be-
tween Member States, can be harmonized.
'2 4
Later, when political forces decided to reinforce their efforts
towards a single market, it was believed that the mere reference to
possible "considerations" of the Commission was perhaps insuffi-
cient. The Single European Act2" - a comprehensive amendment of
the Treaty - had as its overall goal the establishment of a single
23. Case 27/67, Fink Frucht v. Hauptzollamt Mainchen, 1968 E.C.R. 223; Case 170/78,
Commission v. United Kingdom, 1980 E.C.R. 417; Case 169/78, Commission v. Italy,1980
E.C.R. 385; SMIT, HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY - A COMMEN-
TARY ON THE EEC TREATY, ART. 95.03.
24. The question whether a harmonization of direct taxes is excluded by the wording of
Art. 99 cannot be discussed here. Most authors believe that a harmonization is possible on
the basis of Arts. 100, 101 or 235; See also, Smit, Herzog at 3- 460.23.
25. Single European Act of 28 February 1986, Bulletin of the European Communities,
Suppl. 2/1986. See also, T.M.C. Asser, Guide to EEC Legislation, Suppl. p. xxxi (1987).
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internal market by the end of 1992. Apart from institutional and
other policy reforms, the Act replaced the old Article 99 by a new,
more forceful version:
The Council shall, acting unanimously 6 on a proposal from the
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament,
adopt provisions for the harmonization of legislation concerning
turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxa-
tion to the extent that such harmonization is necessary to ensure
the establishment and the functioning of the internal market
within the time limit laid down in Art. 8A.
2
7
It is important to realize that the legislative tool used for the
harmonization is and has always been the directive. 28 Directives
are a form of enactment which are not directed to the individual,
but to the Member States. The Member States, in turn, have the
obligation to adapt their legislation to the contents of the particu-
lar directive.29
3. The Historic Development of the Harmonization
Since the Treaty provisions by themselves created a workable
customs union and limited the distorting effects of fiscal differ-
ences between the Member States, the EC was able to live with the
situation for some time. Once the EC was established, intensive
negotiations began in order to solve the problems created by the
fiscal differences.30
26. The Commission's original proposal called for a qualified majority (Bulletin of The
European Communities, 9/85 p. 10-14); however, the intergovernmental conference insisted
on unanimity, which had been necessary under the original version of ART. 99 EEC TREATY
as well. See, G. Montagnier, Fiscalit, 24 REvuE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEEN [RtDE]
518, 531 (1988).
27. The reference to Art. 8A EEC Treaty is of particular importance. Art. 8A EEC
Treaty, also introduced by the Single European Act, contains the famous 1992 time limit:
"The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing the inter-
nal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992, in accordance with the provisions
of . . . this Treaty.
The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provi-
sions of this Treaty."
28. See, K.R. SIMMONDs, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, Vol B. 10-228
(1989) (Looseleaf).
29. ART. 189 EEC TREATY states:
"A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member
State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the
choice of form and methods. .. "
30. See, Chr. Prout, Federation Internationale pour le Droit Europeen [FIDE] p. 283,
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The first objective was to eliminate the remaining lack of pre-
cision associated with the average border adjustments. The idea
was to find a common turnover tax system that would leave the
"average" adjustment procedure of Article 97 inapplicable. The
system, ideally, would allow export refunds which would corre-
spond precisely to the tax burden of the particular product and
taxation upon import which would burden the imported product
with the same tax as would be levied on a similar national product.
The Member States agreed that the VAT System would be the
most appropriate solution to the problem. As a result, the First
and Second VAT Directives were adopted."1 They provided for the
abolition of the cascade-type turnover tax and for the introduction
of a common "value added tax" system. The basic features of a
VAT system were laid down. 2 Any taxable person'would have the
duty of charging and collecting the tax on his customers while be-
ing able to offset any VAT he had paid to his suppliers.
Ten years after the introduction of the VAT, a second major
step was taken. The Sixth Directive 3 harmonized the taxable ba-
sis, leaving only the tax rate to the discretion of the Member
States. This step was not only important for the own resources of
the European Community Revenues, part of which were from then
on to be calculated on the basis of the VAT,3 4 but it also elimi-
nated most of the remaining actual tax differences between the ec-
onomic operators in the different Member States. In addition, this
step prepared the ground for a possible tax rate harmonization
which was seen as a prerequisite to the relinquishing of tax
borders.
A further step towards harmonization concerned different ad-
ministrative procedures. Certain import/export documents were
standardized, 5 which allowed the usage of the documents in any
287 (Madrid 1990); see also, P. Guieu, L'9limination des barrires fiscales et
l'harmonisation de la TVA, REVUE DU MARCH9 UNIQUE EUROPtEN [RMU], 11, 13 (1992).
31. Council Directive 67/227 of 11 April 1967 Harmonizing the Legislation on Turnover
Taxes, 1967 J.O. 1301; Council Directive 67/228 of 11 April 1967 on the Harmonization of
the Turnover Tax Laws of the Member States (application of common system of VAT), J.O.
1967, 1303.
32. For a detailed analysis of the functioning of the VAT, see infra, Section HI.
33. Council Directive 77/388 of 17 May 1977 Harmonizing Turnover Taxes in the Mem-
ber States, O.J. (L 145) 1.
34. See infra, Section I1(4).
35. The T1 and T2 documents were created first, and later the single administrative
document was established. See Council Directives 85/678 and 85/679/ of 18 February 1985,
O.J. (L 79) 1; see also, P. Guieu, C. Bonnet, Completion of the Internal Market and Indi-
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language throughout the Community. This made it possible to re-
duce the border to only a checkpoint with respect to the actual
export of the goods, allowing for an adjustment procedure at the
place of destination (inland customs).
Excise taxes posed less of a problem in a system of border ad-
justments because it was relatively easy to determine what the tax
burden was for a particular product. Unlike turnover taxes, which
are charged several times during the process of production and dis-
tribution, excise duties are generally levied only once, at the time
the goods are released from bond.
As long as tax neutrality was based upon border adjustments,
the system worked well. However, the Commission began to pro-
pose harmonization of excise taxes as early as 1967. Like the ap-
proach followed for the VAT harmonization, the Commission first
planned on harmonizing the tax structure. It planned to abolish
most excise taxes, concentrating harmonization efforts on:
- tobacco products
- alcoholic beverages, and
- mineral oils
Little progress was made at first. Only recently, and just in
time to meet the 1993 deadline, have the necessary measures been
adopted, including an agreement on certain minimum tax rates. 6
4. The VAT and the Communities' Own Resources
The EC revenue consisted originally of mandatory contribu-
tions of the Member States. This system of financing the EC was
completely modified by the "Decision on the Replacement of Fi-
nancial Contributions from Member States by the Communities
own Resources. 31 7 The Decision created a set of own resources of
the EC. Those resources consisted mainly of the revenues created
by the common external customs duties and a share of the taxable
basis of the VAT. The VAT was used for this purpose because it
was considered to be an adequate measure of the economic activity
in each Member State. It was also the only existing tax which was
rect Taxation, 25 JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES [JCMST] 209, 212 (1987).
36. See infra, Section VI.
37. Council Decision 85/257 of 21 April 1970, 1970 O.J. (L 94) 1; now replaced by Coun-
cil Decision 70/243 of 7 May 1985, 1985 O.J. (L 128) 15.
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widely harmonized throughout the EEC." The Decision was in fact
a formal amendment of the EEC Treaty. 9 It is noteworthy that
this amendment has elevated the existence and the need for the
existence of the VAT throughout the Common Market to the Com-
munities' constitutional level.40 It is hardly a surprise that the
Communities have since considered the VAT to be of particular
importance for the continuation of the integration process.
5. Summary
The development of the VAT within the Common Market can
be summarized as follows: Originally the Member States of the
Common Market applied a variety of cascade turnover tax sys-
tems. Their trade-diverting and competition-distorting effect could
only roughly be corrected by the original Treaty provisions
themselves.
In order to achieve a more equal treatment of traders and con-
sumers, the common VAT system was created. The harmonization
efforts have gone through four steps, with one additional step yet
to come. In the beginning, a general system was created leaving
many details to the Member States as to which transactions were
to be included in the system. In the second major step, the tax
structure was harmonized on the Community level to the extent
that the taxable basis of the VAT was basically identical through-
out the EEC. This became especially important once own resources
of the Community were derived from this common taxable basis.
The third step was the implementation of certain administrative
measures which reduced the paperwork for all involved and made
the operation of the system more suitable for the needs of busi-
nesses. Step four (the introduction of the transitional system) has
38. See, the second to last recital of the preamble of Decision 70/243, 1970 O.J. (L 94)
1.
39. Note that it is not a decision in the sense of Art. 189 (II) EEC Treaty, but is by
reference to Art. 201 para. 3 EEC Treaty, which requires ratification by the member states
(creating a special amendment procedure to the Treaties, deviating from the normal Art.
236 EEC Treaty procedure).
40. The laws of the treaties including the particular amendments are generally consid-
ered to be the Constitution of the EC. This has some implications for the interpretation of
the treaties, which are not to be treated as simple international treaties as commonly known
in public international law. For further reference see, Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the
Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AJIL 1 (1981); Lord Mackenzie Stuart, The
European Communities and the Rule of Law, The Hamlyn Lectures, p. 63 (London 1977);
Gert Nicolaysen, Ansichten zur Gemeinschaftsverfassung, EUROPARECHT 299 (1987).
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just been completed and step five (the introduction of the defini-
tive system) is still to follow.
III. THE VAT SYSTEM UNTIL DECEMBER 31, 199241
1. The Basic Characteristics
The basic features and the working mechanism of the pre-1993
VAT system are best explained using an example. Please refer to
Example I of the Annex, which contemplates a series of transac-
tions leading from the importation of goods by the manufacturer
to the ultimate sale of the goods produced to the consumer. In the
somewhat limited world of this example only two things are sup-
plied to the seller at each stage of the commercial transaction: of-
fice supplies and accounting services. In Example I, all transactions
are carried out in Country A of the EEC, whose tax rate is 14%.
. The first transaction concerns the importation of the raw ma-
terial, worth 1.000,- (fourth column). Import transactions were al-
ways taxable events; 42 therefore, the producer paid an Import VAT
of 140,-. In order to process his goods, he only needs office supplies
(second column) and the services of an accountant (third column).
Both charge 100,- for their supply or service, each adding 14%
(- 14,-) VAT.
These three transactions represent the basic taxable events of
the pre-1993 VAT system. Importation, supply of goods, and sup-
ply of services are the events which are taxable. While imports are
taxable in any case, the supply of goods or services is only taxable
if a "taxable person" (i.e., an entrepreneur acting in his business
capacity) is supplying the goods or services.43
The manufacturer sells his product in turn to the wholesaler
for 2.000,-. This sale (supply of goods) is a taxable event and the
producer requires his customer to pay 14% (= 280,-) as VAT on
top of the 2.000,-. The seller receives the VAT (280,-) on behalf of
the tax authorities. Before turning the money over to the govern-
ment, another important VAT feature comes into play - the right
41. References to the Sixth Council Directive in this section are references to the Direc-
tive in the form applicable before December 31, 1992.
42. Council Directive 77/388 on the Harmonization of Turnover Taxes among the
Member States, art. 2, para 2, 1977 O.J. (L 145) 1 ["Sixth Directive"]; See also, Section
111(4) for the special treatment of certain intra-community transactions of non-taxable per-




of deduction. The taxable person may, before it pays any VAT
proceeds to the government, deduct all business-related VAT ex-
penses. The calculation of the manufacturer is as follows:
280,- [received from wholesaler]
./.140,- [VAT paid upon import]
.J. 14,- [VAT paid to office supply]
.J. 14,- [VAT paid to Accountant]
=112,- [Amount to be paid to the Government]
Note, that the manufacturer bought his raw material for 1.000,-.
His costs in this limited world consisted only of the 200,- paid for
the office supply and for the accountant. Since he sells his product
for 2.000,-, the manufacturer added 800,- in value to the product.
If one applies the tax rate of 14% to this value added, the result is
also 112,-. This demonstrates why the tax is called value added
tax. The tax is designed to be a tax on the value that is added to a
product throughout the entire production and distribution
process.44
The wholesaler sells the good to the retailer for 3.000,- + 420,-
(= 14%) VAT. He too spends 200,- + 28,- VAT for his supplies.
Deducting his VAT expenses, he pays 112,- to the government co-
inciding with the 800,- added value. The retailer acts in a similar
manner. He sells for 4.000,- + 560,- to the consumer, deducts his
VAT expenses, and pays 112,- to the government.
The consumer is not a taxable person. He cannot offset any-
thing against the VAT nor does he have any way of claiming a
refund from the government if he exports the product bought. It is
this factor that makes the VAT an indirect tax, the taxable person
(entrepreneur) being distinct from the person economically bur-
dened by the tax (consumer). In order to establish that the dealers
are not economically burdened, but do not profit from the tax ei-
ther, consider the amount finally received by the government:
44. The term value added must be distinguished from notions of profit because labor
cost and social security payments incurred by the taxable person are not deducted from the
"value added" but obviously influence profit.
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The amount paid by the consumer to the last taxable person
coincides with the amount received by the government from all the
taxable persons who were part of the production and distribution
process.
2. The Legal Framework
a. Generalities
As previously- mentioned, the VAT system is harmonized by
the EC. Two separate sets of legal rules overlap. On one side, the
EC Directives set the basic principles and detailed rules, which the
VAT systems in the various Member States must follow. Yet, each
Member State has to incorporate the particular EC rules into its
own legal system.45 Therefore, all Member States have enacted
VAT Laws which will repeat and incorporate the EC rules laid
down in the directives. The Member States have the power to add
certain rules, fix the tax rate, and generally adapt the VAT rules to
their administrative structure.
The Court of Justice has firmly established that in case of con-
flict between the Community Directives and the national VAT leg-
islation, the Community rules prevail. If the particular rule is suffi-
ciently clear and unconditional, even a private individual can
invoke the directive against the Member State46 who has failed to
adapt its own legal system properly, even though a directive seem-
ingly binds the Member States only vis i vis the Community.
The two main directives which control the VAT system are
the First4 7 and Sixth48 Council Directives on the VAT. While the
45. See, ART. 189 (III) EEC TREATY.
46. See, Case 148/78, Ministero Publico v. Ratti, 1979 E.C.R. 1629, 1 C.M.L.R. 96
(1980) ; Case 8/81, U. Becker v. Finanzamt Minster Innenstadt, E.C.R. 53 (1982); Case 70/
83, G. Kloppenburg v. Finanzamt Leer, E.C.R. 1075 (1984).
47. Council Directive 67/227 of 11 April 1967 on the Harmonization of Legislation Con-
cerning Turnover Taxes, 1967 J.O. 1301.
48. Sixth Council Directive, supra, at note 32.
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First Directive compels the Member States to introduce a VAT
system, the Sixth Directive contains all the detailed regulations
necessary to establish the taxable basis in any particular case. The
analysis of the VAT system can therefore be based primarily on
the Sixth Directive.
b. The taxable person
The VAT is an indirect tax. Therefore, the definition of the
taxable person is of particular importance since the taxable person
is responsible for collecting the tax on behalf of the government,
but is not economically burdened by it.
Article 4 of the Sixth Directive defines a taxable person as an-
yone who independently carries out certain economic activities,
which in turn are defined to include "all activities of producers,
traders, and persons supplying services" including mining and agri-
culture. It is the entrepreneur who is intended to be defined
(whether a private individual or a corporation), as opposed to the
consumer, who in turn is the one to be economically burdened by
the VAT. Public authorities are also excluded from the definition
of taxable persons.49
c. The taxable event
Basically, all acts of supplying goods (i.e., transactions convey-
ing ownership of tangible property) 50 or services (all other transac-
tions51 carried out against consideration by a taxable person) are
taxable events.52 The consumption or use of business assets for pri-
vate purposes also constitutes a taxable event. In addition, all im-
ports are subject to VAT.53
d. The location of a taxable transaction
Only transactions that take place within the territory of a par-
ticular Member State are taxable in that state.5 4 The Sixth Direc-
tive contains elaborate rules defining where a particular transac-
49. Art. 4 para. 5 Sixth Directive, supra, at note 32.
50. Art. 5 para. 1 Sixth Directive, supra, at note 32.
51. Art. 6 para. 1 Sixth Directive, supra, at note 32.
52. See also, Smit, Herzog, supra, at note 23.
53. Art. 2 no. 2 Sixth Directive, supra, at note 32.
54. Art. 2 no. 1 Sixth Directive, supra, at note 32.
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tion is considered to take place. These definitions serve three
purposes:
- to determine the territorial scope of the Community
legislation,
- to assure that all taxable events of international character are
taxed in the state of consumption (destination principle), 55 and
- to assure that the transaction is only taxed in one Member
State (avoidance of double taxation (i.e., distortion of
competition).
Generally speaking, goods are considered to be supplied at the
point where they are located when they were sold. Services are




Certain transactions are exempt from VAT even though they con-
stitute a supply of goods or services or an import. Two major
groups of exemptions should be differentiated. The first group re-
lates to exports. The exporter beneficiary is exempt from its obli-
gation to collect the VAT but may still exercise its right of deduc-
tion of the VAT paid to its suppliers, even if the state, in effect,
has to reimburse the exporter for the VAT.57 This assures that the
exported good is not burdened with any internal VAT of the ex-
porting country.
Other exemptions remove the transaction entirely from the
VAT system. The exempt transaction is treated as if it were car-
ried out between non-taxable persons. Therefore, no tax credit can
be claimed for VAT paid by the supplier of the exempt transaction
to its own suppliers. One set of exemptions of this kind involves
transactions carried out by public or private organizations in the
public interest, in the medical profession, or by charities.5 8 Another
set of such exemptions involves major parts of the banking, insur-
ance, or reinsurance business59 which in several states is subject to
special indirect taxes. It is not a coincidence that these industries
55. See, infra, Section III (4).
56. Art. 9 para. 1 Sixth Directive, supra, at note 32.
57. Art. 15, 17 Sixth Directive, supra at note 32; See also, infra, Section III (3), dealing
with the international aspect of the pre-1993 VAT system.
58. Art. 13 part A Sixth Directive, supra, at note 32.
59. Art. 13 part B Sixth Directive, supra, at note 32.
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are also the least liberalized as far as their business operations in
the Common Market are concerned. Yet another set of exemptions
involves certain imports."0 Apart from exceptions for diplomatic
and other representatives of foreign countries and international or-
ganizations, the exemptions refer primarily to temporary imports,
imports in duty-free zones, and imports of goods in the context of
certain inward processing schemes.
f. The taxable basis and gross VAT
The taxable basis for the calculation of the VAT is, in most
cases, the consideration. received in exchange for the supply of
goods or services."' If such consideration is, for certain specified
reasons, not an adequate measure, then the open market value (or
the costs for the supplier) is the taxable basis62 (e.g., when a taxa-
ble person consumes a good supplied to him in his business capac-
ity for private purposes).
The particular tax rate is applied to this taxable basis. The
rate is left to the Member States to determine.6 3 However, the
Member States have to adhere to the general rules laid down in
Article 95 et seq. of the Treaty. The Court of Justice has ruled on
several occasions that it is incompatible with the Treaty to use the
right to fix the VAT rates to discriminate against products from
other Member States. One of the better known line of cases refers
to discriminatory tax rates for (nationally produced) beer and (im-
ported and highly taxed) wine.64 The Court stated that Article 95
is intended to "guarantee the complete neutrality of internal taxa-
tion as regards competition between domestic products and im-
ported products. 65
Most Member States have more than one tax rate depending
on the kind of transaction. The sale of basic necessities, such as
60. Art. 14 Sixth Directive, supra, at note 32.
61. Art. 11 part A para. 1(a); Art. 11 part B para. 1(a) Sixth Directive, supra, at note
32.
62. Art. 11 part A para. 1(b-d); Art. 11 part B para. 1(b) Sixth Directive, supra, at note
32.
63. Art. 12 Sixth Directive (Art. 12 contains some general rules concerning changes of
rates by the Member States), supra, at note 32.
64. Case 170/78, Commission v. United Kingdom, 1980 E.C.R. 417 (438, Rec. 24) and
(same case) 1983 E.C.R. 2265 (2292, Rec. 27).
65. Case 106/84, Commission v. Denmark, 1986 E.C.R. 833 (para. 10), cited with ap-
proval by Advocate General Luis da Cruz Vilava, Opinion, Case 365/85, Commission v.
Belgium, 1987 E.C.R. 3299, 3307.
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food, is usually taxed at a reduced rate. In 1987, after the publica-
tion of the White Paper, but before the first voluntary alignment
steps were taken, the rates were as follows:66
Country/Tax rate Reduced Standard Increased
Belgium 1&6* 19 25&33
Denmark 22 -
France 2.1-7 18.6 33.33
Germany (F.R.) 7 14 -
Greece 6 18 36
Ireland 2.4&10* 25 -
Italy 2&9* 18 38
Luxembourg 3&6 12 -
Netherlands 6 20 -
Portugal 8* 16 30
Spain 6 12 33
United Kingdom * 15 -
* A zero% tax rate applies in certain cases of domestic produc-
tion, particularly in the United Kingdom and Ireland.
Zero tax rates may be used by the Member States only to a
limited extent. According to Article 28 (2) Sixth Directive and Ar-
ticle 17 last indent of the Second Directive 6 7 they may be main-
tained (insofar as they existed on 31. Dec. 1975) if they are justi-
fied by "clearly defined social reasons and for the benefit of the
final consumer." Because zero rating interferes with the proper
functioning of the VAT system and its self policing nature, mainte-
nance of zero rates was permitted in specific fields as a basis for a
gradual phase-out.
When the British and Irish governments seemed very reluc-
tant to give up any zero rating during the present negotiations,68
the Commission took the initiative by challenging a large number
of both countries' zero rating schemes in Court. The Court held
that the term "clearly defined social reasons" left the Member
States a broad spectrum of discretion, allowing only limited Com-
66. Completion of the Internal Market: Approximation of Indirect Tax Rates and Har-
monization of Indirect Tax Structures, Global Communication from the Commission of the
European Communities, COM(87)320 final/2 at 9 [Completing the Internal Market].
67. Council Directive 67/228 of 11 April 1967 Structure and Procedures for Application
of the Common System of Value Added Tax, 1966-1967 O.J. SPEc. ED. 16. (Euratom).
68. See, the statement of Lord Young ("we are not going to harmonize"- said with re-
spect to zero rating), quoted by G. Montagnier, Fiscalit, 24 RtDE 518,548 (1988).
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munity control. However, the zero rating must only benefit the fi-
nal consumer.6 9 Defining the term "benefit to the final consumer"
narro*ly, the Court struck down many of the zero rating provi-
sions which were applicable to previous production stages. 0 The
remaining zero rates will be maintained even under the new transi-
tional VAT system. 1
A calculatory gross VAT figure is computed by applying the
tax rate to the taxable basis.
g. Deductions
A taxable person can deduct from the gross amount any VAT
that was charged to it by its suppliers in its business capacity. It
can also deduct any VAT on imports paid for goods that are used
for business purposes.72 This right to claim' a deduction ensures
that any VAT expense is not a real cost factor for a taxable person.
For such a person, the VAT is a transient figure to be recorded for
tax purposes, but without influencing the cost structure. A special
problem arises with respect to tax exempt activities for which a tax
deduction is not available.1 3 If a particular business engages solely
in exempt activities, no deduction is possible at all. If the business
is not involved in any exempted transactions, all the VAT paid to
suppliers can be deducted.
The deduction requires the taxable person to have certain
proof of its expenses. 4 Usually a commercial invoice stating the
good or service supplied, the amount, and the VAT paid is re-
quired. In the case of imports, the import document stating the
VAT must be kept.
Deductions in any given taxable period may exceed the gross
VAT which has been incurred. In this case, the net VAT is nega-
tive, representing a refund obligation by the State. The Sixth Di-
rective leaves it up to the State 5 to meet that obligation by re-
funding the excess, or by carrying forward the balance into future
taxable periods.
69. Case 415/85, Commission v. Ireland, 1988 E.C.R. 3097; Case 416/85, Commission v.
United Kingdom, 1988 E.C.R. 3127.
70. Id.
71. See, infra, Section IV(4).
72. Art. 17 para. 2, Sixth Council Directive, supra, at note 32.
73. See, Art. 17 para 2 Sixth Directive, supra, at note 32.
74. Art. 18 Sixth Directive, supra, at note 32.
75. Art. 18 para. 4 Sixth Directive, supra, at note 32.
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3. Administrative Advantages of the VAT
Two major advantages led the Member States to adopt the
VAT system rather than any other turnover sales tax model.
The system allows to differentiate very clearly between taxa-
ble and non-taxable persons (consumers) without the necessity of
intensive controls. The system also ensures that the turnover tax
paid at one production stage does not become an element of the
price for the following production stages.
The administrative advantage is due to the fact that the deter-
mination whether a certain person is taxable and eligible to deduct
his VAT expenses is made in connection with the tax return of
that person. Unlike some forms of sales taxes, where the seller
must determine whether he is permitted to sell a particular prod-
uct tax-free to a commercial user, under the VAT system the tax
authorities themselves make that decision. The second advantage
in this context concerns the chances and risks for tax evasion. Cus-
tomers must be in possession of a proper invoice specifying the
amount of VAT paid, if they want to deduct the VAT paid from
the VAT they owe the State. The seller does not necessarily know
whether his customer is taxable or not, and whether he will make
an offset for VAT purposes. The tax authorities are confronted
with the VAT invoices on both ends, through the taxable person
presenting the VAT return and the customers claiming the deduc-
tion. This enables the authorities to check the correctness of tax
returns without outside controls. This self-policing device7 6 made
the VAT very attractive, especially for those European countries
where tax evasion has traditionally been a problem.
4. The VAT in Intra-Community Trade
The basic difference between national and international trade
for the application of the VAT has already been mentioned: All
exports of goods are tax exempt,77 and all imports of goods,
whether or not carried out by a taxable person, are a taxable
event.7
8
The principle underlying this structure is the so called "desti-
76. Zero rating interferes with this advantage because if no VAT is charged, the recipi-
ent will not supply any information to tax authorities.
77. See, Art. 15 para. 3(b) Sixth Directive, supra, at note 32.
78. See, Art. 2(b), Sixth Directive, supra, at note 32.
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nation principle".7 9 This principle presumes that indirect taxes
burdening the consumer should benefit the consumer's country of
residence in order to avoid double taxation. Goods are to be taxed
where consumed rather than where produced.80
Example II of the Annex shall illustrate the basic mechanism.
Suppose, as in Example I, raw material is being imported into
Country A of the EEC. The price paid for the Import is 1,000,-.
The tax rate in Country A is again 14%.
The importing producer has to pay 140,- VAT. To each of his
suppliers he pays 100,- plus the 14,- VAT for the supply of services
and goods. He, in turn, sells his new product for 2.000,-, charging
the wholesaler 280,- VAT. After he offsets his VAT payment, he
pays 112,- to the Government. So far there is no difference from
Example I.
His customer, the wholesaler, exports the product to Country
B, also a Member State of the EEC (tax rate 20%). The wholesaler
had to incur expenses for office supplies and accounting, including
28,- for VAT. His sale for 3.000,- to the retailer in Country B is tax
exempt. Since the tax exemption for exports does not limit the
right to deduction of VAT paid to suppliers, the wholesaler can
claim from the government of Country A a 308,- reimbursement
(280,- paid to the producer, 14,- to each of his suppliers).
For Country A the transaction has been a zero sum game, be-
cause no revenues were generated and no expenses were incurred.
The repayment of the VAT granted to the wholesaler corresponds
exactly with the tax burden; no hidden export subsidy is involved.
The situation for Country B is different. Upon import, the re-
tailer has to pay the import VAT. He bought the products for
3.000,-, and since the tax rate in Country B is 20%, his VAT-pay-
ment amounts to 600,-. He then needs the service of the account-
ant and office supplies and pays for each 100,- plus 20,- VAT. He
then sells the product to the consumer who in turn pays 4.000,-
plus 800,- VAT. The retailer will therefore deduct 600,- and 40,-
from the VAT received from the consumer and pay the remaining
160,- to the Treasury. In total, Country B receives 800,-, which
79. P. Guieu, C. Bonnet, Completion of the Internal Market and Indirect Taxation, 25
JCMSt 209 (1987); Van Thiel, Harmonization of Turnover Taxes in the European Commu-
nities, 27 EUROPEAN TAXATION 77, 80 (1988).
80. S. Cnossen, Harmonization of indirect taxes in the EEC, BRITISH TAX REVIEW 232,
235 (1983).
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again is equivalent to the VAT burden on the final consumers.
It is important to realize that in order for this system to work
the act of exportation and the act of importation must be policed
by the tax authorities. Therefore, the pre-1993 regulations required
that the exporter must have in his possession some proof of export
in order to claim the tax exemption while the importer must have
an import document stating the amount of import VAT paid8 in
order to deduct the import VAT from the VAT received from his
customers. Many of the former administrative difficulties were re-
duced when the measures directed to simplify export/import were
put into effect, yet, the necessity to obtain at least a visa on the
paper accompanying the goods at the border control remained.
Unlike the internal VAT, the export/import rules have no
built-in self-policing device.8 2 Since the person buying in Country
B is not necessarily the importer and since the transactions are
reported to tax authorities in different Member States, the ques-
tion whether import VAT has been paid corresponding to the tax
exemption requested cannot be checked simply by comparing the
VAT declaration of the two parties involved in the sale. Some form
of import/export certification is therefore necessary at the moment
the goods cross the border between Member States.
A major problem of the system involves intra-Community
transactions between private (non-taxable) persons. It is a special
feature of the VAT system that once the product has reached the
consumer, no tax deductions or export refunds are made. The con-
sumer is intended to be economically burdened by the tax, and it
would therefore not be acceptable to permit any refunds to him.
On the other hand, any import is a taxable event even if car-
ried out by a non-taxable (private) person. The idea behind this is
the assumption that products bought outside the Common Market
are not burdened by the tax and that the country of destination
should have the benefit of the proceeds of the tax.
Consequently, there are distinct obstacles to private sales
across intra-Community borders. While a private sale within one
Member State is not subject to the VAT, 3 the same sale across the
81. Art. 18 I(b) Sixth Directive requires that the person claiming the deduction for
import VAT must hold an import document, specifying him as the consignee or the im-
porter, and stating or permitting calculation of the amount of tax due, see, supra at note 32.
82. See infra, Section 111(3).
83. The supply of goods and services is only taxable if carried out by a taxable person,
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Community fiscal borders is taxable by virtue of the import VAT.
This situation was considered to be acceptable in the begin-
ning because of the relative commercial insignificance of such pri-
vate sales. However, the discrepancy of the tax rates in the various
Member States was thought to make import VAT for non-taxable
persons inevitable. Those differences would have caused enormous
artificial trade diversion because an individual could have shopped
for the lowest tax rate in Europe by going there and bringing back
the goods personally. Only the extension of the import VAT to
(generally) non-taxable persons could avoid such trade diversion.
The realization of the problems that the import VAT created
began soon after the system was introduced. As a result, certain
exceptions were made. Since the EEC Treaty calls for the free
movement of workers and the freedom of establishment, 4 arrange-
ments were made to permit a person exercising these rights to take
personal belongings (including. cars, furniture, professional tools)
across borders, without being subject to the import VAT.8 5 Other
examples of these exceptions include certain goods bought by a
tourist throughout his trip within the EEC or to other foreign
countries.86
Unfortunately, the two areas in which second-hand sales had
some real commercial importance were left without special conces-
sions, however. These being the markets for used cars and used
boats. It took a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities (the famous Gaston Schul cases87) to initiate some
changes in this context. A private individual in the Netherlands
had bought a pleasure boat in France from a non-taxable private
person for 365.000,- FF. Through his customs forwarding agent,
Gaston Schul BV (plaintiff on behalf of importer), he had the boat
Art. 2(a) Sixth Directive, supra at note 32.
84. ART. 48 EEC TREATY; ART. 52 EEC TREATY.
85. E.g., Council Directive 83/183 of 23 March 1983 on Tax Exemptions Applicable to
Permanent Imports from a Member State of the Personal Property of Individuals, 1983 O.J.
(L 105) 64.
86. Council Directive 78/1035 of 28 December 1978 on the Exemption from Taxes of
Imports of Small Consignments of Goods of a Non-Commercial Character from Third Coun-
tries, 1978 O.J. (L 366) 34; see also, Council Directive 69/169 on the Harmonization of Pro-
visions Laid Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action Relating to Exemption
from Turnover Tax and Excise Duty on Imports in International Travel, 1969 O.J. (L 133)
6; these imports may only be of rather limited value.
87. Case 15/81, Gaston Schul Douane Expediteur BV v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten
en Accijnzen, Roosendaal, 1982 E.C.R. 1409 [G. Schul I]; Case 47/84, Staatssecretaris van
Financien v. Gaston Schul Douane Expediteur BV, 1985 E.C.R. 1491 [G. Schul II].
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imported into the Netherlands. The boat had been imported into
France by the seller only one year earlier at a price of 269.571,- FF,
and at that time 17,6% Import VAT had been paid to the French
customs agency. The Netherlands charged an 18% Import VAT on
the importation of the boat claiming that it did not matter
whether or not the importer was a taxable person. On appeal the
matter was referred to the European Court of Justice88 (ECJ, the
Court).
In its judgment, the Court notes that Article 95 of the treaty
prohibits the taxation of foreign products in excess of what is lev-
ied on national products.8 " The Court accepted the argument that
it would constitute unequal treatment if a specific transaction,
which would not be taxable internally, was taxed only because it
involved a seller abroad. It held that such a differentiation is justi-
fied insofar as it compensates for the VAT difference between two
countries. Only such compensation puts the national and the for-
eign product on an equal footing. The Court pointed out that for
commercial sales the (taxable) seller, in effect, receives a refund of
the VAT accumulated in the product through the exemption provi-
sions.90 It is therefore generally adequate to levy the full VAT rate
upon the importation of a product.
This is not true in the case of private sales. The ECJ has de-
duced from its interpretation of Article 95 of the Treaty that the
Import VAT, as a form of border tax adjustment, may be levied on
private sales only insofar as is necessary to burden the imported
good with the same VAT burden that is accumulated in a similar
domestic product."'
It, therefore, held that the Import VAT charged had to be re-
duced by the residual VAT (adjusted to reflect the depreciation of
the goods) originally paid in the country of exportation.
88. See, ART. 177 EEC TREATY, A national Court may request the ECJ to issue a pre-
liminary ruling on any question of EEC Law relevant to a case before it. This ruling is then
binding upon the Court requesting it. Courts of last instance have the obligation to request
a ruling if there is doubt as to the Rule of EEC Law; see also, Case 283/81, Slr. CILFIT v.
Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415.
89. See, Case 169/78, Commission v. Italy, 1980 E.C.R. 385.
90. See infra, Example II.
91. Case 15/81, Gaston Schul Douane Expediteur BV v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten
en Accijnzen, Roosendaal, 1982 E.C.R. 1409; see also, the second ruling in this case, Case 47/
84, 1985 E.C.R. 1491. Similar problems exist in purely national settings, where a taxable
person buys goods from a private consumer for resale, see, Case C-165/88, ORO v. In-
specteur der Omzetbelasting, 1989 E.C.R. 4081.
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Since Article 95 is immediately applicable in all Member
States,92 and Community Law takes preference over national law,93
this interpretation was required to be immediately applied by the
Member States. The decision created significant technical
problems since it was difficult to determine when and at what
value the country of exportation had last charged VAT on a partic-
ular product.94
5. Summary
The European Communities have created a customs union.
The treaty and subsequent secondary legislation established tax
neutrality and a considerable amount of harmonization. The VAT
system in its pre-1993 form and the desire to create an internal
market without frontiers are, however, to a certain extent, incom-
patible. The pre-1993 VAT system was based on the existence of
borders because a taxable event (import) was linked to their exis-
tence. Border controls are needed in order to police the imports
and exports. The very aim of the creation of an internal market is
the abolition of such borders. The fact that imports of non-taxable
persons (the average citizen) are taxable events means that all in-
dividuals are in principle subject to border controls. In the eyes of
an average European, it makes little difference whether he has to
open his suitcase because "real" customs duties are to be enforced
or "only" import VAT. The lack of progress made in this respect
was one of the political forces behind the Single European Act and
the 1992 target. The political fear was that people would associate
Europe only with the large amounts spent on agricultural subsidies
and not with any meaningful progress for them.
Therefore, two basic problems with the pre-1993 system can
be isolated. First, as far as intra-Community trade is concerned,
many delays and substantial costs are caused by the necessity of
providing the export/import documentation. The speed and effec-
tiveness of the actual delivery are reduced because all goods have
92. See, Case 57/65, Lfitticke v. Hauptzollamt Saarlouis, 12 E.C.R. 205 (1966); Case 45/
75, Rewe-Zentrale v. Hauptzollamt Landau, 1976 E.C.R. 181; Case 74/76, lannelli & Volpi v.
D.P.Meroni, 1977 E.C.R .557.
93. See, e.g., Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse administratie der belast-
ingen, 1962 E.C.R. 1; Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585; Case 106/77 Administra-
tione delle Finanze v. Simmenthal [II], 1978 E.C.R. 629.
94. The Court of Justice put the burden of proof in this context on the person request-
ing a limitation of the Import VAT.
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to be presented to customs. Traders bear finance costs because
they have to pay import VAT immediately upon import and can
claim a deduction only in their next periodic tax return.
Second, trade between private persons is effectively hindered
because a private individual's goods are burdened twice with the
VAT if the sale is across the border of any Member State. Retail-
ers in the border regions are effectively prevented from selling
products to private customers from an adjacent country because
the products would be burdened twice.95
IV. THE VAT AS OF JANUARY 1, 19936
1. Introduction
The proposals for the new 1993 structure of the VAT have
changed substantially if one compares the original proposals with
the recently enacted rules. The change, however, is much smaller if
one compares original proposals with what the Council of Minis-
ters has envisaged as the "definitive" system.
This seemingly contradictory statement summarizes the un-
usual course the negotiations took. For technical and political rea-
sons (described below), Finance Ministers could not agree for the
immediate future on the system the Commission proposed, but
they agreed that the definitive VAT system, to be implemented in
1997, would be based on such proposals.
97
The difference between the original proposal and the defini-
tive system, on the one hand, and the pre-1993 and the transitional
system on the other, can be expressed as the difference between
the principle of "taxation at origin" and "taxation at
destination"98
To explain the difference perhaps it is best to describe the ba-
sic features of the original proposal and the envisaged definitive
system first, before turning to "hard law" and describing how the
95. At the time of sale and at the time of importation it is not entirely clear whether
the Gaston Schul rule would apply to such a transaction, since that rule deals with used
goods and application of it would cause a deviation from the destination principle.
96. References to the Sixth Directive in this and subsequent chapters refer to the Sixth
Directive as amended to implement the transitional VAT system.
97. For a more detailed description of the development of the negotiations see, G.
Montagnier, Harmonisation fiscale communautaire, 27 RtdE 79, 106 (1991).
98. See, Chr. Prout, FIDE 1990, p. 283, 289; G. Montagnier, Fiscalit, 24 RtDE 518,
524 (1988); G. Montagnier, Harmonisation fiscale communautaire, 27 RtDE 79, 110 (1991).
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transitional system will work.
2. The Definitive VAT System
During the EC Council of Ministers meeting of June 24, 1991,
the Finance Ministers agreed on basic principles of a transitional
VAT system. They also agreed to implement by January 1, 1997 a
definitive VAT system based on the principle of taxation in the
country of origin.9 9 This is in-line with the Commission's original
proposals, 100 although both the Commission's original proposal and
the Council of Ministers refer to a modified origin taxation.
How would a pure system based on the principle of taxation at
the point of origin work at the outset and what would be the eco-
nomic impact? Please consider Example III of the Annex which
sets out the basic features of such a system. Instead of allocating
the benefit of the VAT to the consumer's country, the idea is to let
each country collect the VAT insofar as the value added was gen-
erated in that country. 101 This could be done by simply treating
the intra-community sale the same way as a national sale, forcing
the receiving country to permit deduction of the VAT charged by
and paid to the seller in the country of origin.
This creates certain technical problems both with respect to
currency compensation and shipments to third countries. But,
more importantly, some general arguments make it difficult to ac-
cept this solution without adjustments. The VAT is an indirect
tax. The party that is economically burdened is the consumer. It is
this feature that led to the acceptance of the destination principle,
according to which that country should receive the proceeds of the
tax whose citizens were burdened by it. 1°o Any other solution
99. The text of the agreement was published in a Commission Memorandum MEMO/
92/13 of 19 February 1992, where the Council agreement is summarized as follows: "ii a W
convenu de remplacer le regime transitoire, en principe le ler janvier 1997, par un regime de
taxation d6finitif reposant sur le principe de la taxation dans le pays d'origine,...".
100. See, Michael Langer, Umsatzsteuer und Binnenmarkt, 44 DER BETRIEB 462
(1991); P. Guieu, L' limination des barri&es fiscales et l'harmonisation de la TVA, REvUE
DU MARCH9 UNIQUE EUROPtEN, 11, 37 (1992); G. Montagnier, Fiscalit6, 24 RtDE 518, 520,
524 (1988).
101. See, S. Van Thiel, Harmonization of the Turnover Taxes in the European Com-
munities: Towards the Internal Market without frontiers, 28 EUROPEAN TAXATION 77, 83
(1988); P.P.S.C. Tielemans, Towards a European Community without Borders: Utopia or
Reality? 27 EUROPEAN TAXATION 207, 208; Chr. Prout, FIDE 1990, p. 283, 289.
102. See, Completing the Internal Market - the Introduction of a VAT Clearing Mecha-
nism for Intra-Community Sales, COM (87)323 final/2, para 1.1.
1992-1993]
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
would imply a transfer of funds from the citizens of one country to
the treasury of another.
Such a transfer might be acceptable, if it were to involve a
transfer from the more prosperous regions to the poorer regions of
the EC, thereby aiding the regional policy of the EC.10 Yet the
probable effects would be to the contrary. The net-exporting coun-
tries (e.g. Germany, Benelux countries)10 4 would likely benefit from
giving up the destination principle, while the countries with less
developed regions are likely to lose out (Ireland, Greece, Portugal,
Spain).105
The shift in benefits would be threefold. On one side, the bal-
ance of payments between the less developed regions and the in-
dustrialized regions is already unfavorable to the less developed re-
gions. Under the present system, the VAT paid by the consumers
stays in the country. Giving up the destination principle would
give an additional advantage to the net-exporting regions.
But even if the balance of payments were equal, abandoning
the destination principle would be an advantage for the industrial-
ized countries. This is because the goods and services supplied in
the less developed areas of the Communities center around agricul-
ture. In almost all Member States, the tax rate for agriculture-re-
lated products is significantly lower than the tax rate for industrial
products and services.'0 6 To give up the destination principle
would seriously change the distribution of the tax revenue. So far,
in the less favored regions, tax revenues are created on the basis of
consumption. Therefore, the tax revenue is based on a mixture of
revenues from industrial and agricultural products. Without the
destination principle, the tax revenues would be created according
to production, and since the less favored regions deal predomi-
nantly in agriculture, revenues would be created predominantly on
the basis of agricultural products. Given the lower tax rates for
these products, the revenue created would be lower in the less de-
veloped countries, while those in the industrialized countries would
increase.
103. See, the new Title V of Part III of the EEC Treaty: "Economic and Social Cohe-
sion", particularly Art. 130a (2), 130b EEC Treaty as amended by the Single European Act.
104. See, Table of Estimated Revenue Flows, EC-Commission, COM (87)323 final at 2.
105. See, Chr. Prout, FIDE 1990, p. 283, 289.
106. The reduced tax rates usually are applicable to basic needs, in particular agricul-
tural products, the normal ones to other products; for a list of products to which such re-
duced rates will apply in the future, see Directive 92/77 of 19 October 1992 on Approxima-
tion of VAT Rates, 1992 O.J. (L 316) 1.
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In addition, Member States with high VAT rates would bene-
fit because they would receive VAT at their rate, against which the
right of deduction based on lower tax rates of goods originating in
other countries would be applied. The low tax rate countries would
have to credit the high level VAT deductions based on goods im-
ported from countries with high tax rates, which would reduce the
low tax rate countries' revenue.1.0
These consequences seem incompatible with the basic goals of
the Common Market, which set out to diminish the differences be-
tween the different regions.
However, the system would be easy to operate since no exemp-
tions would be necessary for intra-community "exports", and im-
ports would not have to be a taxable event.
The principal problems associated with the system relate to
the revenue flows. If one could find a method of adjustment which
would, with a sufficient degree of certainty, correct the "distorted"
revenue flow between Member States, then - it was thought - the
origin principle, coupled with a system of compensatory payments,
would cause the least amount of restrictions to the free movement
of goods.
The "adjustments" required are payments by the benefiting
Member States to those whose revenue decreases. Thus, a system
had to be devised to calculate and to effect the necessary compen-
satory payments. The Commission first proposed the "clearing-
house system". 1 8 Taxable persons under VAT would have had to
report the VAT balance of their intra-Community sales and
purchases separately to their respective tax authorities. Member
States would have reported their total balance to the Commission's
clearing house which would have adjusted the differences between
Member States. Some Member States, in particular France and
the Netherlands, objected 09 on the ground that the system was too
vulnerable to mistakes and proposed to require traders to supply
lists of all intra-Community transactions. The Commission found
this too burdensome for the economic operators involved.110
107. See, H. Nieskens, Das Umsatzsteuer-Binnenmarktgesetz, 47 BETRIEBSBERATER,
Beilage 17, p. 3 (1982); Chr. Prout, FIDE 1990, p. 283, 299.
108. Completing the Internal Market - The Introduction of a VAT Clearing Mechanism
for Intra-Community Sales, COM (87)323 final/2.
109. See, Chr. Prout, FIDE 1990, p. 283, 299.
110. See, COM (87)323 final/2, para. 1.2, 1.4, 1.5.
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A third possible solution, which was later advocated by the
Commission, would have used a macro-economic approach.111
Trade statistics were to be used to monitor the flow of goods and
calculate the corresponding revenue flows. The problem with this
method relates to the accuracy of the statistics and the treatment
of services, which are not covered by trade statistics. Revenue
flows associated with services would not have been monitored and
the adjustments would not have been accurate.'12
The Council of Ministers concluded that the complexity of the
issues, related to reliable yet simple adjustment procedures, were
too complex to be dealt with under extreme time pressure. Several
Ministers, in particular from countries which would have received
money through the compensation system, were not willing to ac-
cept any system which did not permit them to have full confidence
that the system would work from the start, and that they would
receive their "fair" share of the revenue without delay.
These perhaps more technical uncertainties with respect to
the proper adjustment procedure have so far held up the adoption
of the definitive VAT system.
The discussion on this point still seems to be in flux. Any de-
tailed analysis of the "clearing house proposal", the "listing sys-
tem" or the "macro-economic approach" must be postponed until
some common ground is reached in the negotiations. The Commis-
sion seems to favor a revised macro-economic approach based on
improved trade statistics,1 and some observers of the negotiations
have concluded that, if such improved statistics (and the increased
reporting requirements for the economic operators) can be imple-
mented, this model is most likely to be the mechanism upon which
the Member States will agree." 4
It is, however, also possible that the adoption of the definitive
system will be delayed and that the transitional system will share
the fate of many provisional arrangements: it may have a long life.
Let us now turn to the question of whether it will be a happy
life (and whether the people subject to the transitional system will
continue to live a happy life).
111. See, COM (87)323 final at 2, para. 2.2.4.
112. See, Chr. Prout, FIDE 1990, p. 283, 300.
113. COM (90)177 final of June 15, 1990.
114. See, Chr. Prout, FIDE 1990, p. 283, 300.
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3. The Transitional VAT System Effective January 1, 1993
The new transitional system 1 5 for the collection of the VAT is
based on the destination principle. 1 6 The "consumption" of goods
(and services) is taxed in a country of consumption or destination.
For that reason, the system must monitor the goods on their way
from production to consumption to ensure that the tax is charged
at the destination and that the appropriate relief can be granted in
the country of origin. In principle it works in a similar manner as
the previous system, and thus Example II of the Annex still illus-
trates the principal features of the system for commercial
transactions.
a. What does not change
The pre-1993 VAT system was also based on the destination
principle. With the implementation of the internal market, only
intra-Community borders will disappear. The external frontiers of
the Community will continue to exist.
Because within Member States there were no borders to begin
with, the situation with respect to purely national transactions will
not change. Similarly, exports to third countries will be tax ex-
empt, and imports from those countries will be taxable events just
as they were under the old system. Thus, the examples given on
how the VAT system works do not change insofar as no intra-Com-
munity transactions are involved."
7
Secondly, services are provided irrespective of controls at the
frontier. Under the old system, the destination principle was not
115. Adopted through Council Directive 91/680 of 31 December 1991 Supplementing
the Common System of Value Added Tax, 1991 O.J. (L 376) 1, as amended by Council
Regulation 92/111, of 30 December 1992, 1992 O.J. (L 384) 47; see also, Albert J. Ridler,
Die Grundzge der Urnsatzbesteuerung im Binnenmarkt, 1 INTERNATIONALEN STEUERRECHT
[IStR] 2 (1992).
116. See EC Commission, Revised proposal COM (90)182 final of 17 July 1990, 1990
O.J. (C 176) 8; EC Commission, Guide to VAT in 1993 - The New VAT System in the
Frontier-Free Community, Brussels-Luxembourg, p. 1 (1992); Chr. Prout, FIDE 1990, p.
283, 290; H.D. Rondorf, Das Umsatzsteuer-Binnenmarktgesetz, 3 EUROPXISCHE ZEITSCHRxs1
FUR WIRTSCHArSRECHT [EuZW] 727, 728 (1992).
117. Minor changes of the rules applicable to dealings with third countries were neces-
sary. The internal transit rules (goods imported from a third country into Member State A
and released into free circulation there but intended to be shipped immediately to a Mem-
ber State B) will no longer apply with respect to VAT because in such cases the new rules
on the monitoring of goods within the EEC will apply; see also EC Commission, Guide to
VAT, p. 5.
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maintained in this respect on the basis of border controls or simi-
lar devices. With respect to most services, the rules on the defini-
tion of where the service is deemed to have been performed were
sufficient for that purpose. Therefore, the removal of internal fron-
tiers does not affect the functioning of the VAT system insofar as
it relates to services." 8 It is for that reason that the VAT on ser-
vices will also be based on exactly the same principles as have pre-
viously existed.
The only minor change in this context relates to transport ser-
vices. VAT on transport had been technically tied to the transport
of goods, because no VAT was charged in the country of origin and
the import VAT on the goods would be charged on the basis of the
purchasing costs including the transport cost. The new VAT rules
disassociate the VAT on transport services from that of the goods
transported." 9
The important changes, therefore, refer to transactions involv-
ing the shipment of goods from one Member State to another.
Given the fact that both the old and the transitional VAT system
are based on the destination principle, the same amount of VAT
should in the end be paid to the same tax authority. Nevertheless,
the technical way of bringing about this similarity is the important
distinguishing feature between the old and the new system. While
it may sound as if it is a simple thing to do, the technical difficul-
ties are very significant.1
2 0
b. The collection of VAT on intra-Community transactions
The new transitional system replaces the old taxable event
"import" with a new one, the intra-Community "acquisition".'
2'
The old exemption of export is replaced by a similar exemption for
intra-Community transactions with persons who have obtained a
VAT registration number.2 2 This VAT registration, which is based
on similar registrations which existed in some Member States, is
among the most important additional features of the transitional
118. See EC Commission, Guide to VAT, p. 3.
119. See EC Commission, Guide to VAT, annexed note 4.
120. For a description and severe criticism of the new system, see Hans Nieskens, Das
Umsatzsteuer-Binnenmarktgesetz, 47 BETRIEBSBERATER, Beilage 17. (1992).
121. Art. 28(d) Sixth Directive, supra at note 32, as amended by A Council Directive
91/680, art. 1, 1991 O.J. (L 376) 1.
122. Art. 28(c), 22 para. 1(c) Sixth Directive, supra at note 32, as amended by Council
Directive 91/680, art. 1, 1991 O.J. (L 376) 1.
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VAT system. VAT registration requires the purchaser in an intra-
Community transaction to declare and pay VAT in the country of
destination upon completion of an "acquisition". If the seller sells
to a non-commercial purchaser (a purchaser who has no VAT
number), then the Seller is obliged to declare and pay VAT for the
underlying transaction.
For the purposes of the transitional system, four basic types of
transactions with respect to goods can be differentiated:
123
- sales from taxable persons to taxable persons
- sales from taxable persons to economic operators who are not
taxable persons
- sales from taxable persons to private individuals
- sales among private individuals
The rules applying to these transactions will be explained sepa-
rately below.
aa. Transactions between taxable persons
A normal sales transaction between taxable persons would in-
volve a seller in Member State A and a purchaser in Member State
B. A would sell and invoice B without charging VAT provided that
a) B has supplied him with his VAT registration number and
b) the goods are physically transported to another Member State.
If these conditions are not met, A must charge VAT. If the
goods do not leave Member State A, then it is not really an intra-
Community transaction so that the normal (old) rules apply. If B
does not have a VAT number, then A must presume that B is not
really a taxable person and must therefore apply the rules relating
to transactions with private parties.
A, therefore, has the obligation to verify and to maintain suffi-
cient documentation on two things: the VAT number of his cus-
tomer and the intra-Community transport. With respect to the
first verification obligation, A can turn to his home country's tax
administration which will have an on-line computer data base list-
ing all taxable persons and their VAT numbers. With respect to
the second verification obligation, A needs to keep the normal
commercial transport document which provides evidence of an in-
tra-Community transport.
123. See also, H.D. Rondorf, Das Umsatzsteuer-Binnenmarktgesetz, 3 EuZW 727, 728
(1992); A.J. RAdler, Die Grundziige der Umsatzbesteuerung, 1 IStR 2, 3 (1992).
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For verification purposes, the seller must state on his normal
periodic VAT returns the total amount of all intra-Community
sales to customers for which he did not charge VAT. In an addi-
tional special VAT declaration, he must declare for each purchaser
(identified by his VAT number) the amount of such VAT-ex-
empted sales during the last quarter.
The purchaser has to "charge" VAT upon arrival to himself.
However, he has the advantage of being able to charge VAT on the
one side and, in the same tax return, claim the deduction (the set-
off) so that effectively the purchaser is not actually burdened with
any financial charge at the time of the acquisition. This is an ad-
vantage compared to the previous situation where the purchaser
had to pay import VAT and would only be able to claim a refund
for the import VAT in his next periodic VAT return, thus having
to bear certain finance costs. 124 The rules with respect to the value
for tax purposes will be essentially the same as those applied to
national sales. Thus, the net invoice value will determine the value
for tax purposes and not the C.I.F. value (including freight) which
had been important in the context of calculating the import VAT.
This also marks a further alignment of the internal VAT rules with
those relating to intra-Community sales.
While a sale between taxable persons is the most important
and common transaction which involves moving goods from one
Member State to another, there are two other major kinds of
transactions which are not sales. In the new rules these situations
are described as "contract work" and as "transfers".
Contract work takes place if the taxable person in Member
State A sends raw or semi-finished materials to a contractor in
Member State B. 125 After the assembly or contract work has been
performed, the goods are returned to Member State A and A re-
ceives an invoice from B with respect to the work performed (but
not the value of goods originally provided by A). This work had
previously been dealt with as "outward/inward processing" under
special VAT and customs arrangements. Under the new system,
the raw or semi-finished materials are not subject to VAT when
124. EC Commission, Guide to VAT, annexed note 1. Some Member States (e.g. France
and Italy), however, seem to have implemented rules which perpetuate the requirement to
reclaim the "acquisition-VAT" in a subsequent VAT-return. Other Member States have al-
ready asked the Commission to take formal action; see Handelsblatt, 19 February 1993, p.1 .
125. See Art. 28(a)(5)(a) Sixth Directive, supra at note 32, as amended by Council Di-
rective 91/680., 1991 O.J. (L 376) 1.
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they are sent to Member State B. When the goods are returned,
VAT only accrues with respect to the amount charged on the con-
tract work according to the processing agreement. The VAT will
have to be declared in Member State A by the beneficiary of the
contract work. It is, however, necessary to maintain some form of
control over the goods which move within the Community on the
basis of such contract work arrangements. For this purpose, the
new VAT rules require both A in Member State A and B in Mem-
ber State B (who both must be registered traders having VAT
numbers) to keep a special register of products which move under
the special scheme. This additional register did not have to be kept
under the old system (where similar information was compiled by
the customs authorities). Here, an additional burden is placed on
the economic operators. In addition to keeping the registers, the
two parties must also mention the contract work on a summary
statement to the VAT authorities.
Finally, certain transfers of goods may occur if one business
dispatches or transports its goods to another Member State for the
purposes of its own business. If such transfers involve capital goods
(investment items) and goods sent for storage to another Member
State, VAT will accrue on such transfers and the situation will be
considered to be a supply against consideration. 2 " This is neces-
sary because, in the case of stored goods, Member States need to
keep track of where the goods are in order to ensure the correct
taxation in the country of destination. With respect to capital
goods, consumption takes place where the capital goods are actu-
ally used, and it is therefore reasonable to burden the acquisition
of capital goods at the place where they are eventually used. On
the other hand, mere temporary storage or temporary use with the
intent to return the goods to the country of origin or to transfer
them to yet another EEC Member State does not give rise to a
taxable transaction. This is. to avoid unnecessary and additional
burdens on traders and finance authorities.
In such cases the traders are again obliged to keep appropriate
registers 127 which show where and for how long certain goods have
been transferred.
A third category of special transactions refers to sales as part
126. See Art. 28(a)(5)(b) Sixth Directive, supra at note 32, as amended by Council
Directive 91/680, 1991 O.J. (L 376) 1.
127. See Art. 28(h), 22(2)(b) Sixth Directive, supra at note 32, as amended by Council
Directive 91/680, 1991 O.J. (L 376) 1.
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of a chain of sales. As is common practice for many commodities,
goods may be sold from a seller in Germany to a buyer in France,
who in turn sells it on to Spain from where, in turn, the goods are
sold to Portugal. It may happen that the goods will then actually
be shipped from Germany directly to Portugal without necessarily
passing through the two other countries involved. In principle, the
transaction should only be taxed in the country of destination. The
VAT legislation of some Member States already took this into con-
sideration and contains appropriate specific rules,128 even before
the Community was able to adopt some clarifications.1 2 9
The basic principles which govern these rules may seem sim-
ple. However, in practice there are a number of cases (in particu-
lar, combined transfer, outward 'processing and sale in a chain
cases) where it is very difficult to determine who actually has to
pay which tax authority which amount on the basis of which legal
provision. It is this feature which has already caused a substantial
amount of criticism.1
30
The Council has for that reason recently adopted amendments
to the (revised) Sixth Directive and introduced simplification mea-
sures intended to reduce the technical problems which may arise in
this (and certain other) contexts.''
bb. Sales to non-taxable persons
Under the normal application of the existing VAT rules, cer-
tain businesses were fully outside the VAT system (fully exempt
businesses like insurance companies and banks 3 2). Similarly, pub-
lic authorities and other legal persons under public law would be
non-taxable because they do not conduct a business in a technical
sense.
However, where such companies or authorities make substan-
128. See, e.g., § la Abs.1 Nr.1 Satz 2 Umsatzsteuergesetz [German VAT act). As re-
gards the German approach to the newly enacted simplification measures see Drucksache
des Bundesrates 743/92, 27 October 1992.
129. Council Directive 92/111 of 30 December 1992, art. 1, para. 11, 12, 1992 O.J. (L
384) 47. These rules may, however, not be sufficient and have already been criticized; see
Handelsblatt, 19 February 1993, p.6.
130. SEE Hans Nieskens, Das Umsatzsteuer-Binnenmarkt-Gesetz, 47 BETRIEBSBERATER .
Beilage 17, p. 31 (1992).
131. Council Directive 92/111 02 30 December 1992, 1992 O.J. (L 384) 47; See also the
EC Commission's proposal, COM(92)488 final of 4 November 1992.
132. See supra at Section III(2)(e).
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tial purchases in other Member States it was thought that it would
facilitate the operation of the system and reduce distortions of
competition associated with these entities' purchasing volume if
they were treated for purposes of intra-community acquisitions in
the same way as taxable persons. Thus, these operators may apply
for a VAT number (they will still not become liable for VAT on
their sales) and, having received the VAT number, sales by taxable
persons to such operators would be treated as if they had been
made between taxable persons.13
As for those exempt companies or public authorities who do
not wish to be registered for VAT purposes (because they have
only a very small intra-community turnover), sellers in other Mem-
ber States will have to apply in principle the same rules they apply
for sales to individuals in other Member States.
cc. 'Sales by taxable persons to individuals
For sales by taxable persons to private individuals or such
other operators who do not have a VAT number, two different
cases must be distinguished with respect to intra-community sales.
If the taxable person sells and arranges for transport to the indi-
vidual, the sale will be covered by a special regime related to sales
at a distance.
In both cases the responsibilities relating to charging VAT lie
entirely with the seller. If the seller is engaged in distance sell-
ing,"3 his responsibilities depend on his toial distance selling turn-
over. If he sells for more than ECU 100,000 per year into any given
Member State, he must charge VAT in and at the rate of the
Member State of destination (he knows the destination because he
arranges for transport). If he sells below that threshold, then VAT
is charged in and at the rate of the Member State where the seller
is established.
If no sale at a distance is involved (because the purchaser ei-
ther comes to the seller or arranges for transport himself), the sale
is made in the country of the seller and all VAT (regardless of any
special turnover requirements) is charged in and at the rate of the
133. See EC Commission, Guide to VAT, p. 4; H. Nieskens, Das Umsatzsteuer-Bin-
nenmarktgesetz, 47 BETRIEBSBERATER, Beilage 17, p. 7, 8 (1992).
134. See H. Nieskens, Das Umsatzsteuer-Binnenmarktgesetz, 47 BETRIEBSBERATER,
Belage 17, p. 15, 16 (1992).
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Member State of the seller.13 5
It is an important feature of the new system that a private
individual buying goods anywhere in Europe shall be free to trans-
port them to his country of residence without any administrative
restrictions or requirements to pay VAT or other duties or fees.
dd. Sales between private individuals
Intra-community sales between private individuals are not
subject to VAT. VAT is only charged if the sale is made by a taxa-
ble person. A private individual is by definition not a taxable
person.
Although the details with respect to sales of second-hand
goods are still under consideration by the Counci 386 it is clear, re-
gardless of the rules which may be agreed upon with respect to
sales by taxable persons of second-hand goods, that the sale of sec-
ond-hand goods between private individuals will not be subject to
any VAT.
ee. The special regime for new means of transport
In addition to the special rules on sales at a distance, the
Member States devised a special rule with respect to new means of
transport. 3 7 It was thought that in particular cars would be the
most important valuable item which private individuals would buy
by themselves in other Member States if a VAT differential would
make that attractive. No serious transportation problem would be
involved because people would simply drive their new cars home.
Thus, these products could cause significant distortions of compe-
tition if VAT differentials continue to exist. The regime applies,
however, not only to new cars but also to boats, including pleasure
boats; aircraft; motorcycles; etc.
According to this special regime, the intra-community sale of
new means of transportation is VAT exempt in the country of ori-
135. EC Commission, Guide to VAT, p. 4; A.J. Ridler, Die Grundztige der Um-
satzbesteuerung im Binnenmarkt, 1 IStR 2 at 4 (1992).
136. This proposed Seventh Directive is still pending in the Council, see G.
Montagnier, Harmonisation fiscale communautaire, 27 RtDE 79, 118 (1991).
137. EC Commission, Guide to VAT, p. 4; H. Nieskens, Das Umsatzsteuer-Bin-
nenmarktgesetz, 47 BETRIEBSBERATER, Beilage 17, p. 9 (1992); H.D. Rondorf, Das Umsatz-
steuer-Binnenmarktgesetz, 3 EuZW 727, 730 (1992).
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gin even if made to a private individual. The good would then be
taxed in the Member State of destination. That the taxes are actu-
ally paid is insured by tying the VAT payment requirement to the
registration process for the vehicle concerned. This appears to be a
very practical solution, in particular with respect to cars, as there
already is a system of tight control with respect to the requirement
of driving only registered cars on public roads.
c. Fraud prevention and exchange of information
Since the transitional system will not benefit from the "self
policing" nature of the internal VAT,'38 additional control mecha-
nisms were devised by the Member States. 39
As mentioned above, the economic operators must verify that
their customer has a VAT number, and must report the total value
of their intra-community supplies to each customer (identified by
the VAT number) on a quarterly basis to the tax authorities. On
the basis of a computerized system, Member States will regularly
exchange the information thus received. Tax authorities on both
ends of the transaction know or can determine the turnover de-
clared by the traders involved. The system also has a second func-
tion. All Member States' tax authorities will have access to all
VAT numbers and the corresponding company name of the eco-
nomic operators established in other Member States. Thus, a
trader who wishes to determine whether his customer really is reg-
istered for VAT purposes and has a "valid" VAT number can con-
tact his own tax authority to verify information supplied by the
customer.
As data protection laws in Member States restrict tax authori-
ties from communicating information covered by the "tax secret"
to other tax authorities in the Community, the EC needed to adopt
special rules to authorize the data transfer. Therefore, the Council
adopted the respective Regulation.'40
138. See supra Section 111(3).
139. See M. Langer, Umsatzsteuer und Binnenmarkt, 44 DER BETRIEB 462, 465 (1991);
A.J. Ridler, die Grundzge der Umsatzbesteuerung im Binnenmarkt, 1 IStR 2, 5 (1992).
140. Council Regulation 218/92 of 27 January 1992 on Administrative Cooperation in
the Field of Indirect Taxation, 1992 O.J. (L 24) 1.
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4. Approximation of the Tax Rates
After very extensive deliberation the Ministers of Finance
managed to agree on certain lower limits for the VAT rates.
Under the pre-1993 system, determination of the VAT rates
was left entirely to the Member States. In fact, the rates as well as
the goods and services to which they applied differed signifi-
cantly.141 Were these rates to be left unchanged, a strong trade-
diverting effect would have been created, especially between neigh-
boring countries where large VAT-induced price differences would
have led to an artificial trade diversion and possible tax fraud.
142
The trade diversion would only apply to sales to the ultimate
consumer or tax-exempt entities (government agencies, banks, hos-
pitals). 143 For the taxable person, the VAT is only a transient posi-
tion, whether it is high or low is of little interest because any VAT
payment he makes can be credited against his VAT-receipts. The
rate of the VAT, however, is important to the final consumer, and
his buying behavior will be influenced by high VAT differentials.'"
Most Consumers would find it an attractive idea to travel from
say, France to Luxembourg or Spain, if they could find the goods
for 6.6% less due to the VAT differential. In case of luxury items
(say a luxury car) the differential can be far greater (e.g. 33.33% in
France, 14% in Germany equals a 19.33% price difference). 45
The willingness of the tinal consumer to take advantage of this
price difference is limited by several factors. The cost of transpor-
tation is a major one,'46 but there are other factors such as the
nuisance caused by having to spend time and effort in an unknown
shopping environment, differences in warranty rules, etc. The
Commission concluded that only significant VAT differentials
141. See supra at Section III(2)(f).
142. EC Commission, Completion of the Internal Market: Approximation of Indirect
Tax Rates and Harmonization of Indirect Tax Structures, COM (87)320 final at 2, p.11; see
also S. Menner, A. Haufler, Wettbewerbsverzerrungen und Harmonisierung der Umsatz-
steuer im Europdischen Binnenmarkt, 37 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 128
(1991).
143. See supra at Section III(2)(e).
144. See EC-Commission, COM(87)320 final at 2, p.11; Chr. Prout, FIDE 1990, p. 283,
294; M. Bos, H. Nelson, Indirect Taxation and Completion of the Internal Market of the
EC, 27 JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES [JCMSt] 27, 38 (1988).
145. See table of pre-1993 VAT rates, supra at Section III(2)(f).
146. See EC-Commission, COM(87)320 final at 2, p.11; M. Bos, H. Nelson, Indirect
Taxation and Completion of the Internal Market of the EC, 27 JCMSt 27, 38 (1988).
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would lead to considerable trade diversion and tax fraud. 147 There-
fore, it was not strictly necessary to reach a point where all Mem-
ber States charge the exact same tax rate for a particular product.
The differentials had only to be limited, especially between neigh-
boring states. A one rate harmonization would not have been polit-
ically realistic, because the revenue problems created would have
been too large for several Member States.
148
The proposal for an approximation directive dealt with three
technical problems: the number of rates, their level, and the alloca-
tion of goods and services to the rates.149 The proposal called for
the introduction of two different rates in all Member States: a re-
duced and a standard rate. 50 Presently, almost all Member States
use more that one rate, and the Commission took that as an indi-
cation that some differentiation was desired. However, it did not
propose a three rate system, which was considered to create too
many complications and ambiguities. To clearly define which rate
ought to be applied to which service or good would be difficult.
While the pre-1993 reduced tax rates had a certain common de-
nomination with respect to the products they applied to, the in-
creased tax rates did not. The reduced tax rates comprised about
30% of the taxable basis, 15 while the increased rates in their di-
versity only applied to about 10%.152
On the basis of this proposal (as modified), 5 ' but only after
significant discussions, the Council of Ministers agreed' to allow
standard and reduced rates only. However, they agreed that each
Member State should be allowed to have two different reduced
147. EC Commission, COM(87)320 final at 2, p.11 .
148. EC Commission, COM(87)320 final at 2, p.11; S. Menner, A. Haufler, Wettbewerb-
sverzerrungen und Harmonisierung der Umsatzsteuer, 37 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN
WIRTSCHAFr 128 (1991), claiming that a rate unification is legally necessary; this isolated
opinion is not shared by the author.
149. EC Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive supplementing the Common
System of VAT and amending Directive 77/388 on Approximation of VAT rates,
COM(87)321 final at 2, p.1, revised proposal, 1990 O.J. (C 176) 8.
150. EC Commission, COM(87)320 final at 2, p.11; proposed art. 12(3)Sixth Directive
as amended by EC Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Supplementing the Com-
mon System of VAT and Amending Directive 77/388: Approximation of VAT rates,
COM(87)321 final at 2, p.1.
151. EC Commission, COM(87)320 final at 2, p.11 .
152. EC Commission, COM(87)320 final at 2, p.10.
153. See revised EC Commission proposal of 17 July 1990, 1990 O.J. (C 176) 8.
154. Council Directive 92/77 of 19 October 1992 Supplementing the Common System of
Value Added Tax and Amending Directive 77/388 on Approximation of VAT Tates, 1992
O.J. (L 316) 1.
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rates as had previously been the case in some Member States.
A more important deviation from the original proposals by the
Commission is that only the lower limits of the VAT rates are
fixed. Based on British thoughts, the idea behind fixing only lower
limits was the idea that too diverse upper limits would be elimi-
nated by "competition" among Member States. Consumers would,
if rate differentials were too great, show an increased tendency to
go and buy in a lower rate Member State.155 That would effectively
mean that countries imposing a high VAT rate would lose tax reve-
nue because the turnover would be generated in other Member
States.
Thus, the Council of Ministers agreed that the minimum rate
of the standard rate as of January 1, 1993 shall be 15%. The nor-
mal minimum rate for the reduced rate(s) is set at 5%.
Several Member States have certain zero-rate schemes. The
directive allows Member States which presently use zero rates or
"super reduced rates" to maintain them to a limited extent and
only with respect to goods covered by the reduced rate.
The goods to which the reduced rate must be applied are set
out as a new Annex H to the Sixth Directive and include 17 items,
most of which refer to basic needs of the population (foodstuffs,
water supplies, pharmaceutical products, medical equipment for
the disabled, transport of passengers, supply of books, newspapers
and periodicals, admission to theater shows, etc.). 56
V. THE ORIGINAL SITUATION AND THE PLANS FOR HARMONIZATION
WITH RESPECT TO EXCISE DUTIES
1. Excise Duties Before Harmonization
Before the end of 1992, a wide variety of excise duties existed
in the various Member States. The variety covered not only the
types of excise duties levied but the rate and tax structures applied
as well.
The following table shows the revenue generated in the vari-
ous Member States with respect to their various excise duties. 5 '
155. The Belgian experience shows that such competition exists, see M. Dassesse, Rap-
port national belge, FIDE 1990, p. 31, 34.
156. Annex H is published with Directive 92/77 of 31 October 1992, 1992 O.J. (L 316) 4.




SEE TABLE 1. EEC: Revenue Importance of Sales Taxes and Ex-
cises, 1980
The bulk of the revenue is generated by three types of excise du-
ties: tobacco, mineral oil and alcohol. The relative insignificance of
the rest of the excise duties is set out in the following table, indi-
cating the (lack of) importance of such "nuisance taxes". 15s
SEE TABLE 2. EEC: Receipts from Nuisance Taxes, 1980.
In order to reduce the large variety of taxes and their dis-
torting effects on competition, the Commission initiated proposals
for the harmonization of such excise duties as early as 1972. How-
ever, little progress was made for many years, with some excep-
tions in the case of excise duties on manufactured tobacco.'59
The reason for the slow progress was attributed by the Com-
mission to "a symbiotic relationship between national industries
and national excises".160 However, Community Law was not with-
out impact on the national excise duty laws. Some of the more pro-
tectionist forms of excise duties were struck down by the Court of
Justice,16' usually because they were discriminatory in the sense of
Article 95 of the Treaty. The evolving body of case law provided
some guidance for the Commission and the Member States with
respect to the basic principles which the proposals and the final
compromise had to comply with.
2. The Development of Plans for Harmonization
In its first proposals, the Commission had attempted to tackle
the excise duty harmonization in the same way as the VAT harmo-
nization - harmonizing the tax structure first and worrying about
the tax rates later. Its proposals for the structural harmonization
date as far back as 1972.162 The proposals were not accepted at
158. Id. at 232, 251.
159. See Chr. Prout, FIDE 1990, p. 283, 304; S. Cnossen, Harmonization of indirect
taxes in the EEC, BRITISH TAX REVIEW, 232, 245 (1983).
160. Quoted by S. Cnossen, Harmonization of indirect taxes in the EEC, [1983] British
Tax Review, 232 (245).
161. Case 170/78, Commission v. United Kingdom, 1980 E.C.R. 417; Case 168/78, Com-
mission v. France, 1980 E.C.R. 347.
162. The framework of the Commission's proposals is laid down in the Bulletin of the
European Communities, Suppl. 3/72; see also Report to the Council on the Scope of Conver-
gence of Tax Systems in the Community, 20 March 1980, COM(80)139 final; for subsequent
proposals see K.R. Simmonds (Ed.), Encyclopedia of European Law (looseleaf), Vol B., para
B-10-230, London (1974). In the context of the white paper the Commission published spe-
cific proposals, see COM(87)325 final at 2 through COM(87)328 final at 2.
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that time. This was due to a certain general reluctance, after the
first enlargement of the Community, to deepen the integration pro-
cess because of the many technical difficulties which were noticed
to their full extent only when the proposals were discussed and
analyzed in detail and also due to the very diverse interests of the
Member States (some produce wine, others beer, others cigarettes,
etc.).1
63
When the Commission published the "White book", it be-
lieved that, with the disappearance of border tax adjustments, a
differencein excise duty rates would greatly distort competition.1
It therefore pursued a strategy of having both the structural pro-
posals and the rate unification adopted at the same time.16 5 The
Commission intended to abolish all but three types of excise
taxes. 66 Only the excise on the use of alcohol, cigarettes and min-
eral oils would be maintained. These excises would not only be
harmonized, but effectively unified.1 67 To reduce the impact of pos-
sible revenue disruption, the Commission proposed unified rates on
the basis of the average rate of the duties in the various Member
States. While use of a weighted average ensures complete revenue
neutrality on the level of the Community as a whole, an arithmetic
average gives equal weight to each Member State, that, in itself,
being an important principle of the Community's structure.1 68 The
Commission, therefore, proposed a combination of the two averag-
ing methods.
The Commission felt that the VAT proposals left enough room
for maneuver in order for the Member States to allow a "unifica-
tion" of the excise taxes. Several arguments support that view.
163. Chr. Prout, FIDE 1990, p. 283, 305; see also W. Ritter, Steuerharmonisierung als
Voraussetzung eines EG-Binnen-marktes, 44 BETRIEBSBERATER 77, 81 (1989).
164. Since excise duties amount to cost factors for the business community (unlike the
VAT) even relatively small rate differentials will induce diversion of trade; see M. Bos, H.
Nelson, Indirect Taxation and the Completion of the Internal Market of the EC, 27
JCMSt 27, 38 (1988).
165. EC Commission, COM(87)320 final at 2, p. 15,16.
166. See EC Commission, COM(87)320 final at 2, p. 15; see also proposed Council
"Framework Directive" submitted on March 7th, 1972, Bulletin of the European Communi-
ties, Suppl.3/1972; Alex Easson, Tax Harmonization in the EEC: The Commissions pro-
gram, BRITISH TAX REVIEW 329, 331 (1981).
167. See G. Montagnier, Harmonisation fiscale communautaire, 27 RtDE 79, 120
(1991); M. Bos, H. Nelson, Indirect Taxation and the Completion of the internal market of
the EC, 27 JCMSt 27, 41 (1988).
168. See EC Commission, COM(87)320 final at 2, p. 16; see also M. Bos, H. Nelson,
Indirect Taxation and Completion of the Internal Market, 27 JCMSt 27, 42 (1988).
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VAT is charged on top of any applicable excise duty.6 9 Any differ-
ences with respect to such duties will automatically have repercus-
sions on the VAT. It seems sensible to avoid this inherent instabil-
ity and instead to permit the Member States some leeway with
respect to the VAT rates in order to satisfy their budgetary needs.
Secondly, and more importantly, excise tax differentials have a
much stronger impact on commerce and trade than VAT differen-
tials. 7 0 The VAT paid by an enterprise to its supplier is only a
transient figure and not a real cost factor, because of the right to a
set-off.'7 ' Excise duties, however, constitute a real cost factor. The
rate of the excise is a determining factor for the cost (and the
price) of a taxed product. Producers of goods which are subject to
the excise duty or producers which need raw material for which an
excise duty is imposed have a competitive advantage if they pro-
duce at a place where a low excise duty applies.
Under the pre-1993 system, border tax adjustments tied to im-
port/ export procedures (as in the case of VAT) ensure tax neutral-
ity. 72 Once border controls and adjustments disappear, problems
arise. The important difference between VAT and excise taxes is,
therefore, that trade diversion is likely to occur with excise taxes
on all production levels, while VAT differentials create trade diver-
sion only insofar as they constitute a cost factor - and that occurs
only at the level of the final consumer.7 3
Since excise duties are much more likely to interfere with the
goals of the Common Market and the neutrality of competition, it
seemed appropriate to try to eliminate those differentials
altogether.
A complete unification, coupled with a system where excise
duties are imposed once the goods are released from bond, would
have allowed the removal of fiscal frontiers without creating the
need for compensation between Member States, as in the case of
VAT. The destination principle with respect to commercial trans-
169. G. Montagnier, Fiscalitg, 24 RtDE 518, 528 (1988).
170. See M. Bos, H. Nelson, Indirect Taxation and the Completion of the Internal
Market of the EC, 27 JCMSt 27, 41 (1988).
171. See supra Section 1II(f)-HI(g).
172. S. Cnossen, Harmonization of indirect Taxes in the EEC, BRMSH TAX REVIEW
232, 235 (1983).
173. Certain entities are in a similar situation as the final consumer: such as, the VAT
exempt sector (banks, insurance, health care) and government entities, see supra Section
Ill(2)(e).
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actions would have been effectively ensured by economic logic:
since the duty is identical it makes sense to wait as long as possible
to release it from bond. The real taxable event (release from bond)
would then generally take place in the country of final
consumption.
174
However, the Commission seemed to have underestimated
both the weight of the "symbiotic relationships" and the impor-
tance which national treasuries attach to their fiscal sovereignty.
The proposals met with significant resistance in various Member
States. As in the case of the VAT, Member States indicated that
they would not accept upper limits even with respect to excise
taxes.
The Commission was forced to restructure its proposals. 175
Harmonization of the tax structure coupled with a minimum rate
was proposed instead of a perfect unification of excise taxes.
This change in the structure of the approach had one major
impact. With a unified excise tax, relatively simple rules on the
control of the movement of goods subject to an excise before it is
levied would have bedn sufficient. However, if tax rate differentials
exist, it is necessary to ascertain compliance with the destination
principle and to ensure that the distortion of competition and the
budgetary effects are kept to a minimum. For this reason it was
necessary to devise a system which monitors the movement of such
goods and ensures that the excise duties in the context of commer-
cial transactions are paid in the country of consumption (that is,
the country of destination).
VI. THE RULES ON EXCISE DUTIES APPLICABLE AS OF JANUARY 1,
1993
The Finance Ministers of the Member States came under in-
creasing political pressure after the heads of state 17  reaffirmed
their political commitment to remove the border controls as of
January 1, 1993.
At the end of 1990, they agreed in principle that goods subject
to excise duties would move within the EC under a system of inter-
174. See EC Commission, COM(87)320 final/2, p. 7; G. Montagnier, FiscalitW, 24 RtDE
518, 531 (1988).
175. See EC Commission, modified proposals, COM(89)525 final through COM(89)527
final; G. Montagnier, Harmonisation Fiscale Communautaire, 27 RtDE, 79, 121 (1991).
176. E.g., the European Council, EC-Bulletin December 1990 para. 1.11.
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connected warehouses.177 In the course of the year 1991, they
agreed in principle to accept a harmonized excise structure and
minimum rates, but were still far from a compromise as to concrete
details.
The first important definitive step was the adoption in Febru-
ary 1992 of a directive to monitor the movement of goods subject
to excise duties within the EC. 78 These rules had to be adopted,
pending resolution of the issues related to the details of the struc-
ture and rate of the excise duties, to allow the enterprises and tax
administration involved sufficient time to prepare for the imple-
mentation of such measures by the end of 1992.
Then, in July 1992, the Ministers agreed on minimum VAT
and excise duty rates pending resolution of more technical issues
and certain derogations for Member States. Finally, during their
meeting of October 19, 1992, most of the remaining issues were re-
solved and the excise duty directives were adopted.""
1. The General System Regarding Goods Subject to Excise Duties
The removal of frontiers and border checks made it necessary
to find other means of monitoring the movement of goods which
are subject to excise duties, especially for those goods whose duty
is not yet paid. If the aim is to ensure payment in the country of
consumption, one must also keep track of such goods for which the
duty has been paid.
Even before the introduction of the new system, goods subject
to excise duties were normally stored in bonded warehouses and
duties were paid only when the goods were actually needed
(processed, sold) upon removal from bond. The new Directive is
based on this existing feature.180 It calls for the establishment of a
network of bonded warehouses. The network allows the free move-
ment of goods between bonded warehouses in one Member State
to those of another without the duty becoming due. The release
from bond triggers the excise duty to become due in the Member
177. G. Montagnier, Harmonisation fiscale communautaire, 27 RtDE 79, 122 (1991).
178. Council Directive 92/12 of 25 February 1992 on the General Arrangements for
Products Subject to Excise Duty and on the Holding, Movement and Monitoring of Such
Products, 1992 O.J. (L 76) 1, Subsequently Amended to Introduce Certain Procedural Sim-
plifications, Council Directive 92/108, 1992 O.J. (L-390) 124.
179. See generally, H. Jatzke, Das neue Verbrauchssteuerrecht im EG-Binnenmarkt,
48 BETRIEBSBERATER 41 (1993).
180. Council Directive 92/12, arts. 6, 15, 1992 O.J. (L 076) 1.
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State of consumption (that is, the destination).
In order to facilitate trade in such goods even further, the Di-
rective allows transactions between bonded warehouses and certain
categories of commercial buyers of bonded goods,181 where the sus-
pension of the excise duty is extended to such transaction (duty
becomes due upon arrival at the commercial buyer, who is de-
scribed as either a registered trader or a non-registered trader, the
latter has to put up a guarantee in the amount of the duty due
upon arrival of the goods).
To ensure the destination principle, goods for which the duty
has been paid in one Member State but which are "exported" for
commercial purposes to another Member State will be subject to
the excise duty upon arrival in the new Member State. The buyer
can reclaim the excise duty in the Member State of origin, pro-
vided that certain administrative procedures were followed with
respect to the transaction.182
However, the transactions of private parties for non-commer-
cial purposes do not require the excise duty in the country of desti-
nation and a refund cannot be claimed in the country of origin.
Thus, for those transactions the origin principle applies. Private
use is deemed to exist for transactions below certain threshold
quantities, but if an individual can prove that larger than thresh-
old quantities are not intended for commercial use, they will be
treated as non-commercial. Hence, the internal frontiers will disap-
pear only for the private individuals, while commercial traders will
only avoid border controls but will remain subject to the duty of
the country of consumption.
Certain technical details as regards paperwork and procedures
to be followed were criticized as impractical. Thus, on December
14, 1992, the Council adopted some last minute changes and tran-
sitional rules (as it did as regards the VAT rules) in order to ac-
commodate some of the criticism. 8 '
2. Harmonization with Respect to Tobacco
8 4
In December 1972 the Council adopted Council Directive
181. Council Directive 92/12, art. 6, 1992 O.J. (L 076) 1.
182. Council Directive 92/12, art. 22, 1992 O.J, (L 076) 1.
183. Council Directive 92/108 of 31 December 1992, 1992 O.J. (L 390) 24.
184. See COM(87)325 final at 2; COM(87)326 final at 2, G. Montagnier, FiscalitW, 24
RtDE 518, 537 (1988); G. Montagnier, Harmonisation fiscale communautaire, 27 RtDE 79,
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72/464/EEC, 55 which has been amended subsequently. 8  A second
directive was adopted in December 1978.187
The objective of the measures is to harmonize the tax struc-
ture. The Member States undertook not to burden manufactured
tobacco with any indirect tax other than VAT and the excise duty
described in the Directives.188 Manufactured tobacco is said to in-
clude cigars, cigarettes, cigarrillos and other forms of smoking to-
bacco. Snuff and chewing tobacco, included in the original defini-
tion, have been excluded from the scope of application'8 9 as part of
the recent compromise. The second Directive defines these terms,
allowing some differing national traditions to be maintained. °90
The excise duty on cigarettes must contain two elements - a
specific (fixed) per unit part and a proportional (ad valorem) part,
to be calculated on the maximum retail price.19' In addition, VAT
must be charged. The fixed part must be kept within certain lim-
its."92 The Member States may also impose a minimum tax, pro-
vided that it does not exceed 90% of the total tax charged to the
most popular price category for cigarettes or fine cut tobacco.' 93
The Directive also leaves the manufacturers and importers
free to set the maximum retail selling price for each of their prod-
ucts,9 although the states are free to maintain or introduce price
control mechanisms.'95
823 (1991); H. Jatzke, Das neue Verbrauchssteuerrecht im EG-Binnenmarkt, 48 BETRME-
SBERATER 41, 42 (1993).
185. Council Directive 72/464 of 19 December 1972 on Taxes Other Than Turnover
Taxes Which Affect the Consumption of Manufactured Tobacco, 1972 O.J. (L 303) 1.
186. An important modification was introduced by Council Directive 77/805 of 19 De-
cember 1977, 1977 O.J. (L 338) 22; the Directive 72/464 was last amended by Art 1 of Coun-
cil Directive 92/78 of 19 October 1992, 1992 O.J. (L 316) 5.
187. Second Council Directive (79/32/EEC) of 18 December 1978 on taxes other than
turnover taxes which affect the consumption of manufactured tobacco, O.J. L 10/8 of
16.1.1979, last amended by Art. 2 of Council Directive 92/78/EEC of 19.10.1992, O.J. L 316/
5 of 31.10.1992.
188. Shoup, in: Smit Herzog, The Law of the EEC, Commentary, Release 11-8/84, Art.
99.06 p. 3-466.10; S. Cnossen, Harmonization of indirect taxes in the EEC, BRITISH TAX
REVIEW, 232, 246, 248 (1983).
189. Council Directive 72/464 as amended by Directive 92/78.
190. Council Directive 79/32 of 18 December 1978 on Taxes Other than Turnover Taxes
Which Affect the Consumption of Manufactured Tobacco, 1979 O.J. (L 10) 8.
191. See Council Directive 92/79, art. 1(2) of 19 October 1992, 1992 O.J. (L 316) 8.
192. See Council Directive 72/464, art. 10(b) as amended.
193. Council Directive 72/464, arts. 10(b), 10(c)(5) as amended.
194. Council Directive 72/464, art. 5(1).
195. Council Directive 72/464, art. 5(2); see also, Case 13/77 G.B. Inno v. A.T.A.B.,
1977 E.C.R. 2115 (2150, para. 64).
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The Commission proceeded on the basis of existing legislation.
The 'three elements taxation', consisting of the fixed excise duty,
the ad valorem portion and VAT part, will continue to apply to
cigarettes. Also with respect to cigarettes, the compromise calls for
an overall minimum duty level of 57% of the retail selling price of
the price category most in demand. 196 The Member States can allo-
cate this to the fixed and ad valorem part of the duty as they see
fit, provided that the overall minimum duty rate is maintained.
With respect to the other types of tobacco, Member States have a
choice. 197 They can introduce either:
- an ad valorem duty,
- a specific duty by 'quantity',
- or a combination of both.
The minimum duty is as follows:
- for cigars and cigarettes: 5% of the retail selling price OR ECU
7 per 1000 items or per kilogram,
- for fine cut smoking tobacco intended for the rolling of ciga-
rettes: 30% of the retail selling prices OR ECU 20 per kilogram,
- for other smoking tobaccos: 20% of the retail selling price OR
ECU 15 per kilogram.
The Commission had based its original proposals on the arith-
metic average between the tax rates as they are presently levied by
the Member States. In choosing the arithmetic average, which
caused the tax rate to be higher than with a weighted average, the
Commission took into account that its health policy calls for a re-
duction of tobacco consumption. 98 Using the tax provisions of the
Treaty to implement the health policy may reach a "grey zone" of
Community Law,' 99 but similar ideas are pursued by Member
States. The final compromise on the duty rates has reduced the
originally proposed rates. The Directives do not mention health
policy considerations in their recitals. It is unclear whether this is a
reaction to criticism as to the legality of using the tax provisions of
196. Council Directive 92/79, art. 2, on the Approximation of Taxes on Cigarettes, 1992
O.J. (L 316) 8.
• 197. See Council Directive 92/80, art. 3, on the Approximation of Taxes on Manufac-
tured Tobacco Other Than Cigarettes, 1992 O.J. (L 316) 10.
198. See EC Commission, Report to the Parliament on the Harmonization of Excise
Taxes, COM(82)61 final; EC Commission, Europe against Cancer, COM(86)717 final.
199. Pierre H. Teitgen, Colette Megret, La fume de la cigarette dans la "zone grise"
des comp~tences de la C.E.E., 17 RtDE 68 (1981).
224 [Vol. 2
INDIRECT TAXATION
the EC Treaty to pursue health policy concerns. 200
3. Harmonization with Respect to Mineral Oils
In August 1973 the Commission proposed a Directive to har-
monize the structure of the excise duties on mineral oils. 201 The
Directive defined the taxable products with reference to the Com-
mon Customs Tariff.
20 2
The new proposals203 of the Commission and the compromise
reached by the Council204 follow this approach.2 0 5 A broad defini-
tion of mineral oils (including certain gaseous hydrocarbons) in-
cludes various special categories, namely petrol (gasoline in leaded
and unleaded form), gas oil (diesel), heavy fuel oil, liquid petro-
leum gas (LPG) and kerosene. Directive 92/82 establishes rates
which ought to be charged by the Member States with respect to
the defined products. The rates for some products vary, however,
depending on the use of the mineral oil. The highest rate applies if
the product is used as a propellant for motor vehicles; a medium
rate if the product is used in stationary motors, plants or machin-
ery for construction, civil engineering, and public works; with the
most favorable rate applying to mineral oils used for heating
purposes.
The following rates were fixed:
20 6
200. See John W. O'Hagan, Kevin M. Carcy, The Proposal for Upward Alignment of
Tobacco Taxes in the European Community: A Critique, BRrISH TAX REVIEw 329 (1988).
201. EC Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Harmonization of Excise
Duties on Mineral Oils, COM(73)1234, 1973 O.J. (C 92) 36.
202. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Harmonization of Excise Duties on Min-
eral Oils, COM(73)1234, 1973 O.J. (C 92) 36.
203. EC Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Approximation
of the Rates of Excise Duties on Mineral Oils, COM(87)327 final at 2.
204. Council Directive 92/81 of 19 October 1992 on the Harmonization of the Struc-
tures of Excise Duties on Mineral Oils, 1992 O.J. (L 316) 12, as amended as regards certain
technical details by, Council Directive 92/108, 1992 O.J. (L 390) 24; Council Directive 92/82
of 19 October 1992 on the Approximation of the Rates of Excise Duties on Mineral Oils,
1992 O.J.(L 316); Council Decision 92/510 of 19 October 1992 authorizing Member States to
maintain certain reduced tax rates, 1992 O.J. (L 316); see also, H. Jatzke, Das neue Ver-
brauchssteuerrecht im EG-Binnenmarkt, 48 BETRI-SBERATER 41 (1993).
205. Council Directive 92/81, art. 2; Council Directive 92/82, art. 2.
206. Council Directive 92/82, arts. 3,8.
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TYPE OF PROPULSION STATIONARY HEATING
OIL MOTORS,
ETC.
Unleaded 287 ECU/10001 287 ECU/10001 287ECU/10001
Petrol
Leaded 337 ECU/10001 337 ECU/10001 337 ECU/10001
Petrol
Gas Oil 245 ECU/10001 18 ECU/10001 18 ECU/10001
Heavy 13 ECU/1000kg 13 ECU/1000kg 13 ECU/1000kg
Fuel Oil
LPG 100 ECU/ 36 ECU/ 0 ECU/1000kg
Methane 1000kg 1000kg
Kerosene 245 ECU/ 18 ECU/ 0 ECU!1000kg
1000kg 1000kg -____________
The advantage granted to unleaded fuel reflects the present
situation of the Member States, but is also an expression of the
environmental policy pursued by the Commission.
The use of mineral oils for purposes other than in motors or
for heating is to be exempt from the duty, as well as for use in air
and sea navigation (private planes and pleasure crafts are not
exempted).20
Due to the large variety of existing exemptions, reductions,
special rules, etc., the compromise allows the Member States to
continue to apply a large number of exemptions either perma-
nently or for a limited time period. 08
4. Harmonization of the Excise Duty on Alcohol
Prior to the publication of the "White book", all Member
States taxed the consumption of alcohol through excise duties. 0°
As alcohol serves many different functions, many different types of
alcohol exist. Excise taxes have traditionally been imposed only on
207. Council Directive 92/81, art. 8.
208. Council Directive 92/82, arts. 3,4,5,9: Council Directive 92/81, art. 8; Council Deci-
sion 92/510.
209. S. Cnossen, Harmonization of Indirect Taxes in the EEC, BRITISH TAX REVIEW




ethyl alcohol fit for human consumption. Denatured alcohol, which
is unfit for human consumption, has been traditionally outside the
scope of the tax.
The scope and structure of the tax varied widely. However,210
many important differences remained, such as differences between
distilled and fermented alcoholic beverages, beer, wine and spar-
kling wines, intermediate products and such products which con-
tain drinkable (undenatured) ethylic alcohol, like cosmetics, per-
fumes and toiletries.
The compromise211 on the structural harmonization of the ex-
cise duties on alcohol is based on existing rules in some Member
States and on "pre-White book" proposals. 12 They define several
types of alcoholic beverages to which different tax rates213 apply.
These different types are defined through a reference to the Com-
mon Customs Tariff (the so called "combined nomenclature").
The rate approximation was an unusually difficult task. In its
proposal,214 the Commission not only had to take into account the
general objectives, such as revenue neutrality and cost structure
maintenance, but it also had to consider several principles 21 5 which
had been subject to litigation in the Court of Justice.
The Court had established that Member States could not pro-
tect their local beer production by charging higher duties on (im-
ported) wine than on the (locally produced) beer. 1e Similar rules
applied to the taxation of spirits.2 1
210. S. Cnossen, Harmonization of Indirect Taxes in the EEC, BRiTISH TAX REVMW
249 (1983); Commercial Clearing House, Common Market Reporter (Looseleaf), art. 99 para.
3201.09 (Chicago 1962-1989).
211. Council Directive 92/83 of 19 October 1992 on the Harmonization of Excise Duties
on Alcohol and Alcoholic Beverages, 1992 O.J. (L 316) 21; see also, H. Jatzke, Das neue
Verbrauchssteuergesetz im EG-Binnenmarkt, 48 BTRIMBSBERATER 41 (1993).
212. See EC Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Harmoniza-
tion of Excise Duties on Alcoholic Drinks, COM(82)153 final; see also Commercial Clearing
House, Common Market Reporter (Looseleaf), art. 99 para. 3201.09 (Chicago 1962-1989).
213. Council Directive 92/84 of 19 October 1992 on the Approximation of the Rates of
Excise Duty on Alcohol and Alcoholic Beverages, 1992 O.J. (L 16) 29.
214. EC Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Approximation of the
Rates of Excise Duty on Alcoholic Beverages and on the Alcohol contained in other Prod-
ucts, COM(87)328 final at 2.
215. See J. Sedemund, Wettbewerbsneutralit~it als Verfassungs-gebot bei der
Steuerharmonisierung fflr alkoholische Getrinke, 2 EuROPscHE ZErrScHRiFT FOR WIRT-
SCHAFTS-RECHT 658 (1991).
216. Case 170/78, Commission v. United Kingdom, 1980 E.C.R. 417, see also [same
case] 1983 E.C.R. 2265 (Re: excise duties on wine).
217. Case 168/78, Commission v. France, 1980 E.C.R. 347.
1992-1993]
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Commission was also faced with an originally very diverse
rate structure and corresponding revenue differentials in the sev-
eral Member States. The Commission was forced to accept a rather
low minimum tax rate of ECU 550 per 100 hl pure alcohol for ethyl
alcohol, compared with a Community average of ECU 1271/h1. 18
However, the minimum rate is coupled with a standstill clause:
Member States may not reduce their pre-existing tax rate to below
ECU 1000/hl. The total compromise looks as follows:
- Beer21 : ECU 0,748/hi/degree Plato or
ECU 1,87/hi/degree of alcohol
Reduced rates can be introduced for small breweries and for low
alcohol beers.
- wine' 2° (and similarly for other fermented beverages22):
still wine 0 ECU/hl product
sparkling wine 0 ECU/hl product
- intermediate products122 (products other than wine and beer hav-
ing an alcoholic content of between 1,2% and 22%:
ECU 45/hl product
A reduced rate can be applied to products of low alcoholic content.
Contrary to earlier proposals, the tax must be determined on the
basis of the quantity of the product.
23
- ethyl alcohol224 (in particular all forms of drinkable spirits):
ECU 550/hl pure alcohol 225 but Member States may not reduce
their pre-existing tax rates to below ECU 1000/hl.
218. EC Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on Approximation of the Rates
of Excise Duty on Alcoholic Beverages and on the Alcohol contained in other Products,
COM(87)328 final at 2 p. 4 para 2.
219. Council Directive 92/83, art. 3; Council Directive 92/84, art. 6.
220. Council Directive 92/82, art. 8; Council Directive 92/84, art. 5.
221. Other fermented beverages (e.g. sparkling apple cider) are treated, for most pur-
poses, like wine (Art. 15, Directive 92/83); product definition Art. 12, Directive 92/83; tax
rate Art. 5 Directive 92/84 and Art. 15 Directive 92/83.
222. Council Directive 92/83, art. 17; Council Directive 92/84, art. 4.
223. EC Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive -Harmonization of the Structure
of Excise Duties on Alcoholic Drinks, COM(85)151 final; the proposal was still pending after
the publication of the White paper, see EC Commission, Third Report on the Implementa-
tion of the Commission's White paper, COM(88)134 final, Annex p. 20.
224. Council Directive 92/83, art. 20; Council Directive 92/84, arts. 3(1), 3(2).
225. A per total alcoholic content tax was advisable in order to comply with certain
GATT rules; Agreements reached in the Tokyo Round of multilateral Trade negotiations,
H.Doc. 95.153, part I, 96th Cong. 1st Sess., June 19, 1979 at page 665; this being a reaction
to a U.S. Court decision, Bercut-Andervoort & Co. v. United States, 46 C.C.P.A. 28 (1958).
228 [Vol. 2
INDIRECT TAXATION
A reduced rate can be applied to products from small distilleries.
The Directive on the harmonization of the tax structure con-
tains a number of exemptions2 26 from the excise duty. Denatured
alcohol (made unfit for human consumption) is not subject to the
duty, and a refund can be obtained for a duty paid for alcoholic
drinks which, due to their age or condition, become unfit for
human consumption after the duty has been paid. The Member
States may exempt other uses of alcohol (use in medicinal prod-
ucts, scientific research, etc.).
5. Summary
The three groups of products which have traditionally gener-
ated substantial revenues for Member States will continue to bene-
fit them. While excise duties on other products are not formally
banned, the use of such duties will decrease because collection of
such duties may not be associated with frontier controls and the
products would not be circulating within the bonded warehouse
system.227 Hence, several Member States have abolished other
forms of excise duties (e.g. Germany eliminated its sugar, salt and
lamp taxes). On the whole, the tax structure with respect to indi-
rect taxes will be much less diverse and easier to understand as of
January 1, 1993.
VII. EVALUATION
The plan to create a single European Market is as old as the
Communities themselves. However, the expectations people had 'of
a free and open Europe when the Communities were founded 228
was not quick to materialize. Indeed, the expectation has still not
turned into reality - despite many advances.
During the eighties it was felt that the "Common Market" was
not likely to turn into a truly integrated market unless there was
additional legal and political momentum. "Eurosclerosis" was
feared. The most important counter-move was a parliamentary ef-
fort: the draft treaty establishing the European Union.229 The
226. See Council Directive 92/83, art. 27.
227. See Council Directive 92/12, art. 3.
228. Students burning customs barriers were the celebrated public messengers of those
feelings.
229. Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, adopted by parliament on 14 Feb-
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Treaty, after having focused the discussion in both political and
academic circles, led to the subsequent White Paper of the Com-
mission 230 and its general endorsement by the European Council.
This resulted in the drafting and subsequent adoption of the Sin-
gle European Act,231 which called for the implementation of the
Internal Market before the famous deadline of December 31,
1992.232
The drafters of the Single European Act could not know that,
by the time the White Paper projects were about to reach the fin-
ish line, they would face important competition from political at-
tention and substantial skepticism from the people because yet an-
other "Euro-project" was under discussion. The Maastricht
Treaty, which deals with quite different issues, was negotiated and
subsequently debated in national parliaments in 1991 and 1992.
The negative first Danish referendum increased the skepticism and
many old "euro-sins" (e.g. the cost of agricultural subsidies, the
lack of democratic structures) were associated with Maastricht or
the Single European Act, even if these Treaties had been intended
to remedy the problems in part or had nothing to do with the
problems.
The discussions and problems relating to the Maastricht
Treaty may, however, have actually aided in the process of having
the 1993 White Paper projects adopted, because many govern-
ments needed "European results" both internally (to be able to
claim that European issues were high on the agenda and that the
government had again been successful in defending the countries'
interests in Europe) and because they realized that a standstill
would increase skepticism and would amount to a step back.
The Commission has increasingly forcefully advocated its
opinion that no border controls can be maintained for any reason
after January 1, 1993. It fears that the continued use of border
controls for any reason would cause Member States to use them
for other old purposes as well. It has therefore threatened to sue
those Member States which do not abolish the controls. 33
ruary 1984; See F. Capotorti, M. Hilf, F. Jacobs, J.P. Jaqub, The European Union Treaty,
Oxford 1986.
230. EC Commission, Completing the Internal Market, White paper from the Commis-
sion to the European Council, COM(85)310 final of 14 June 1985.
231. Single European Act of 28 February 1986, Bulletin of the European Communities,
Suppl. 2/1986.
232. ART. 8 A EEC TREATY, as amended by the Single European Act.
233. See EC Commission, Communication on the Lifting of Internal Border Controls,
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The remaining intra-community borders fulfill only limited
functions.234 A limited number of immigration controls are carried
out and compliance with certain sanitary and safety regulations is
checked, but it is an important remaining function of the border
controls to monitor the importation or exportation of goods, so
that the tax adjustments associated with import and export can be
carried out.
Recently some skepticism has arisen concerning whether in-
migration controls can (or should) be abolished. The Schengen
Agreement which was intended to move such controls to the exter-
nal borders has not been ratified yet, and the (illegal) influx of
many Eastern European immigrants had not been expected at the
time the Single European Act was adopted. Similarly, issues of
crime control and fighting drug trafficking are used to defend the
need for some border controls. It is difficult to determine (and cer-
tainly falls outside the scope of this article) what effect these dis-
cussions will have.
For an evaluation of the results of tax harmonization it suffices
to note that the removal of the need to use border controls for tax
adjustments is an indispensable requirement for abolishing inter-
nal frontiers. The success of the idea of a Single European Market,
therefore, depends to a very large extent on whether a workable
solution is adopted with respect to "tax-borders".
Evaluating the Commission's original proposal from a techni-
cal standpoint reveals that the Commission kept its promise to
present functional solutions, which insist on the abolition of the
tax frontiers in their entirety.23 5 However, the original proposals
will only be adopted (probably in a modified form) as part of the
final system, envisaged by the Council for January 1, 1997.
The transitional VAT rules continue to apply the destination
principle, which assumes the existence of countries and borders.
However, the system complies with the important overall aim - it
of 6 May 1992, Europe Documents, No. 1773 of 12 May 1992; see also EC Commission,
Seventh Report concerning the implementation of the White Paper, COM(92)383
final of 2 September 1992.
234. Regarding the other issues which need to be clarified before the Internal Market is
fully operational, see EC Commission, Seventh Report, COM(92)383 final.
235. Pierre Guieu, Claire Bonnet, Completion of the Internal Market and Indirect
Taxation, 25 JCMSt 209, 221 (1987); Servaas van Thiel, Harmonization of Turnover Taxes
in the European Communities: Towards the Internal Market without Frontiers, EUROPEAN
TAXATION 77,84 (1988).
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will work without frontier controls, thus eliminating a large
amount of red tape and administrative procedures."'
It does burden the economic operators with a set of very com-
plex rules for situations where they engage in trading activities
which are a little more complex than a simple sale between two
parties. The risk of making mistakes is on them, rather than on the
Member States' administrations, which may make matters worse if
they adopt conflicting interpretations on how the system should
operate. Does it make sense, then, to introduce new and complex
rules for only four years, and would it not have been easier and
wiser to wait four more years and introduce the definitive VAT
rules immediately?
In summary, the answer is that it does make sense. It is ques-
tionable whether Member States would muster the political will to
come to an agreement later. Psychologically, Europe needed to
prove to itself that there is progress now. Member States will gain
experience in an environment without frontiers. They will be able,
on the basis of the new VAT returns, to monitor VAT flows and to
assess, to a larger extent, the likely revenue flows at the time of the
shift to the origin principle. The national administrations will gain
experience in the exchange of large amounts of data. This may
eventually become a basis for a clearing mechanism which would
contain some of the characteristics of the proposed French "listing
system". Thus, Member States may look at the transitional system
as a test to determine how the proposed definitive system would
work best. The majority of the traders will find it easier to operate
under the transitional system than under the old system.
The political evaluation of the final compromise is an even
more difficult task. The Commission arrived only at a rough esti-
mate of the impact its proposals would have on the revenues of the
various Member States.37 In particular, those countries which may
suffer revenue losses seem to worry.238 The Member States have
not published their complete estimates but have usually deter-
mined that they would lose more than the Commission had esti-
mated. 3 9 France is afraid that it will not be able to raise direct
236. The Commission has estimated that approximately 60 million customs declara-
tions per year will no longer be necessary.
237. See Chr. Prout, FIDE 1990, p. 283, 296.
238. P. Guieu, C. Bonnet, Completion of the Internal Market and Indirect Taxation,
25 JCMSt 209, 219 (1987).
239. The French Prime Minister Rocard called the effect of the proposed VAT rates a
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taxes to an extent such that the losses will be compensated.2 40 This
problem will be even greater for countries like Denmark, which not
only has a high quota of indirect taxes, 241 but which already main-
tains an equally high quota with respect to direct taxes. The coun-
tries with comparatively low VAT rates fear the inflationary and
the regressive effects of the upward alignment of indirect taxes. 42
Having reached an agreement on the lower levels of VAT and
excise taxes, these effects and problems will doubtlessly be ana-
lyzed during the course of the coming years on the basis of the
actual revenue development. The evolving data will also influence
the willingness for further political compromise. The fact that a
compromise was finally reached may be an indication that the po-
litical will to create a more unified Europe is still alive.
The drive to complete the Internal Market by the end of 1992
has spurred fears of the coming "Fortress Europe", which would
exclude third countries' business interests.
This study shows, however, that advantages will accrue for the
third country businessmen as well. Red tape will be cut. Once a
product has been imported to one of the Member States, it will be
easier to send it to another destination within the Common
Market.
The Single European Market can be a device to effectively
limit the danger of national protectionism. One example may
demonstrate that: In 1982 France ordered that all VCRs produced
in third countries had to be inspected by the hopelessly understaf-
fed customs office of Poitiers. The inspection had to take place,
regardless of whether or not the VCRs had been legally imported
into another Member State and enjoyed therefore the privileges of
the free movement of goods.243 By carrying out the inspections at a
time when most of the Christmas business imports were to take
place, France effectively limited the number of (in particular Japa-
nese) VCRs imported. The Christmas business was lost even
"pauperisation de l'Etat", see G. Montagnier, Fiscalit6, 24 RtDE 519, 548 (1988); with re-
spect to Belgian estimates see M. Dassesse, Rapport National Beige, FIDE 1990, p.3 1 ,3 4 .
240. G. Montagnier, Fiscalit6, 27 RtDE 519, 548 (1988).
241. See EC Commission, Completing the Internal Market, White Paper, COM(85)310
final, p. 47 para. 189.
242. See P. Guieu, C. Bonnet, Completion of the Internal Market and Indirect Taxa-
tion, 25 JCMSt 209, 219 (1987).
243. See EC Commission, Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 11/1982, para.
2.1.10; EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Bulletin, para. 2.4.9; Resolution, 1982 O.J. 334/85 of 20 De-
cember 1982, see also EUROPEAN PARLAMENT, Documents 1-872/82 and 1-896/82.
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though the Commission brought an infringement procedure 44
against France.
Under the provisions which have now been adopted, no
French customs control will exist with respect to goods already im-
ported into other Member States. The Single European Market
will be an effective buffer against protectionist measures in the in-
terest of a particular Member State.
Looking at 1992 from this angle, the fears that have surfaced
in the U.S. and elsewhere with respect to the effects of the Single
European Market seem unfounded. Not only European businesses,
but also their foreign competition will gain advantages.
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